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Differential privacy is a promising privacy-preserving paradigm for statistical query processing over sensitive data. It works
by injecting random noise into each query result, such that it is provably hard for the adversary to infer the presence or absence
of any individual record from the published noisy results. The main objective in differentially private query processing is to
maximize the accuracy of the query results, while satisfying the privacy guarantees. Previous work, notably [Li et al. 2010],
has suggested that with an appropriate strategy, processing a batch of correlated queries as a whole achieves considerably
higher accuracy than answering them individually. However, to our knowledge there is currently no practical solution to find
such a strategy for an arbitrary query batch; existing methods either return strategies of poor quality (often worse than naive
methods) or require prohibitively expensive computations for even moderately large domains. Motivated by this, we propose
low-rank mechanism (LRM), the first practical differentially private technique for answering batch linear queries with high
accuracy. LRM works for both exact (i.e., ǫ-) and approximate (i.e., (ǫ, δ)-) differential privacy definitions. We derive the
utility guarantees of LRM, and provide guidance on how to set the privacy parameters given the user’s utility expectation.
Extensive experiments using real data demonstrate that our proposed method consistently outperforms state-of-the-art query
processing solutions under differential privacy, by large margins.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Differential privacy [Dwork et al. 2006c] is an emerging paradigm for publishing statistical
information over sensitive data, with strong and rigorous guarantees on individuals’ privacy.
Since its proposal, differential privacy has attracted extensive research efforts, such as in
cryptography [Dwork et al. 2006c], algorithms [Dwork et al. 2010; Hardt and Talwar 2010;
McSherry and Talwar 2007], database management [Ding et al. 2011; Hay et al. 2010;
Li et al. 2010; Rastogi and Nath 2010; Xiao et al. 2011; Xiao et al. 2010; Peng et al. 2013],
data mining [Bhaskar et al. 2010; Friedman and Schuster 2010], social network analysis
[Rastogi et al. 2009; Hay et al. 2009; Sala et al. 2011] and machine learning [Blum et al. 2008;
Chaudhuri et al. 2011; Rubinstein et al. 2012]. The main idea of differential privacy is to inject
random noise into aggregate query results, such that the adversary cannot infer, with high confi-
dence, the presence or absence of any given record r in the dataset, even if the adversary knows all
other records in the dataset besides r. The adversary’s maximum confidence in inferring private
information is controlled by a user-specified parameter ǫ, called the privacy budget. Given ǫ, the
main goal of query processing under differential privacy is to maximize the utility/accuracy of the
(noisy) query answers, while satisfying the above privacy requirements.
This work focuses on a common class of queries called linear counting queries, which is the
basic operation in many statistical analyses. Similar ideas apply to other types of linear queries,
e.g., linear sums. Figure 1(a) illustrates an example electronic medical record database, where each
record corresponds to an individual. Figure 1(b) shows the exact number of HIV+ patients in each
state, which we refer to as unit counts. A linear counting query in this example can be any linear
combination of the unit counts. For instance, let xNY , xNJ , xCA, xWA be the patient counts in states
NY, NJ, CA, and WA respectively; one possible linear counting query is xNY +xNJ+xCA+xWA,
which computes the total number of HIV+ patients in the four states listed in our example. Another
example linear counting query is xNY /19 + xNJ/8 + xCA/37, which calculates the weighted
average of patient counts in states NY, NJ and CA, with weights set according to their respective
population sizes. In general, we are given a database with n unit counts, and a batch QS of m linear
counting queries. The goal is to answer all queries in QS under differential privacy, and maximize
the expected overall accuracy of the queries.
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(a) Patient records (b) Statistics on HIV+ patients
Fig. 1. Example medical record database
Straightforward approaches to answering a batch of linear counting queries usually lead to sub-
optimal result accuracy. Consider processing the query set Q = {q1, q2, q3} under the ǫ-differential
privacy definition, detailed in Section 3. One naive solution, referred to as noise on result (NOR),
is to process each query independently, e.g., using the Laplace mechanism [Dwork et al. 2006c].
This method fails to exploit the correlations between different queries. Consider a batch of three
different queries q1 = xNY + xNJ + xCA + xWA, q2 = xNY + xNJ , q3 = xCA + xWA. Clearly,
the three queries are correlated since q1 = q2 + q3. Thus, an alternative strategy for answering
these queries is to process only q2 and q3, and use their sum to answer q1. As will be explained
in Section 3, the amount of noise added to query results depends upon the sensitivity of the query
set, which is defined as the maximum possible total change in query results caused by adding or
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removing a single record in the original database. Under ǫ-differential privacy, the sensitivity of the
query set {q2, q3} is 1, because adding/removing a patient record in Figure 1(a) affects at most one
of q2 and q3 (i.e., q2 if the record is associated with state NY or NJ, and q3 if the state is CA or
WA), by exactly 1. On the other hand, the query set {q1, q2, q3} has a sensitivity of 2 (under the ǫ-
differential privacy definition), since a record in the above 4 states affects both q1 and one of q2 and
q3. According to the Laplace mechanism, the variance of the added noise to each query is 2∆2/ǫ2,
where ∆ is the sensitivity of the query set, and ǫ is the user-specified privacy budget. Therefore,
processing {q1, q2, q3} directly incurs a noise variance of (2 × 22)/ǫ2 for each query; on the other
hand, executing {q2, q3} leads to a noise variance of (2 × 12)/ǫ2 for each of q2 and q3, and their
sum q1 = q2 + q3 has a noise variance of (2 × 2)/ǫ2 = 4/ǫ2. Clearly, the latter method obtains
higher accuracy for all queries.
Another simple solution, referred to as noise on data (NOD), is to process each unit count under
differential privacy, and combine them to answer the given linear counting queries. Continuing the
example, this method computes the noisy counts for xNY , xNJ , xCA and xWA, and uses their
linear combinations to answer q1, q2, and q3. This approach overlooks the correlations between
different unit counts. In our example, xNY and xNJ (and similarly, xCA and xWA) are either both
present or both absent in every query, and, thus, can be seen as a single entity. Processing them as
independent queries incurs unnecessary accuracy costs when re-combining them. In the example,
NOD adds noise with variance 2/ǫ2 to each unit count, and their combinations to answer q1, q2, and
q3 have noise variance 8/ǫ2, 4/ǫ2 and 4/ǫ2, respectively. NOD’s result utility is also worse than the
above-mentioned strategy of processing q2 and q3, and adding their results to answer q1.
In general, the query set Q may exhibit complex correlations among different queries and among
different unit counts. As a consequence, it is non-trivial to obtain the best strategy to answer Q
under differential privacy. For instance, consider the following query set:
q1 = 2xNJ + xCA + xWA
q2 = xNJ + 2xWA
q3 = xNY + 2xCA + 2xWA
NOR is clearly a poor choice, since it incurs a sensitivity of 5 under the ǫ-differential privacy
definition (e.g., a record of state WA affects q1 by 1, and q2 and q3 by 2 each). The sensitivity
of NOD remains 1, and it answers q1, q2, and q3 with noise variance 2 × (22 + 12 + 12)/ǫ2,
2×(12+22)/ǫ2 and 2×(12+22+22)/ǫ2 respectively, leading to a sum-square error (SSE) of 40/ǫ2.
The optimal strategy in terms of SSE in this case computes the noisy results of q′1 = xNY /8+xWA,
q′2 = −3xNY /8 − xCA and q′3 = xNY /4 − xNJ . Then, it obtains the results for q1, q2, and q3 as
follows.
q1 = q
′
1 − q′2 − 2q′3
q2 = 2q
′
1 − q′3
q3 = 2q
′
1 − 2q′2
The sensitivity of the above method is also 1, because (i) adding/removing a record of state NJ,
CA and WA can only affect queries q′3, q′2 and q′1, respectively, by at most 1; (ii) adding/removing a
record of state NY causes the results of q′1, q′2 and q′3 to change by at most 1/8, 3/8, and 1/4, respec-
tively, leading to a maximum total change of 1/8+3/8+1/4=1. We introduce the formal definition of
sensitivity later in Section 3. Hence, independent random noise of variance 2 × 12/ǫ2 = 2/ǫ2 is
injected to the results of each of q′1, q′2 and q′3. Their combination q1 = q′1−q′2−2q′3 thus has a noise
variance of 2×(12+(−1)2+(−2)2)/ǫ2 = 12/ǫ2. Similarly, combining q′1−q′3 to answer q2 and q3
as above incur a noise variance of 2× (22+(−1)2)/ǫ2 = 10/ǫ2 and 2× (22+(−2)2)/ǫ2 = 16/ǫ2
respectively. The SSE for queries q1 − q3 is thus 12/ǫ2 + 10/ǫ2 + 16/ǫ2 = 38/ǫ2.
Observe that the there is no simple pattern in the query set or the optimal strategy. Since there is
an infinite space of possible strategies, searching for the best one is a challenging problem.
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Li et al. [Li et al. 2010] first formalize the above observations (i.e., answering a correlated query
set with an effective strategy) into the matrix mechanism. However, as we explain in Section
2.2, the original matrix mechanism lacks a practical implementation, because the solutions in
[Li et al. 2010] for finding a good strategy are either inefficient (which incur prohibitively high com-
putational costs for even moderately large domains), or ineffective (which rarely obtain strategies
that outperform naive methods NOD/NOR). Later, Li and Miklau [Li and Miklau 2012] propose
the adaptive mechanism, which can be seen as an implementation of the matrix mechanism. This
method, however, still incurs some drawbacks as discussed in Section 2.2, which limit its accuracy.
Motivated by this, we propose the first practical realization of the matrix mechanism, called the
low-rank mechanism (LRM), based on the theory of low-rank matrix approximation. LRM applies
to both ǫ-differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, two most commonly used differential
privacy definitions today. We analyze the utility of LRM under (ξ, η)-usefulness [Blum et al. 2008],
a popular utility measure. Extensive experiments demonstrate that LRM significantly outperforms
existing solutions in terms of result accuracy, sometimes by orders of magnitude.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous studies on differential
privacy. Section 3 provides formal definitions for our problem. Section 4 presents the mechanism
formulation of LRM under ǫ-differential privacy. Section 5 discusses how to solve the optimization
problem in LRM. Section 6 extends LRM to answer queries under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Section
7 verifies the superiority of our proposal through an extensive experimental study. Finally, Section
8 concludes the paper.
2. RELATED WORK
Section 2.1 surveys general-purpose mechanisms for enforcing differential privacy. Section 2.2
presents two methods that are closely related to the proposed solution, namely the matrix mech-
anism and the adaptive mechanism.
2.1. Differential Privacy Mechanisms
Differential privacy was first formally presented in [Dwork et al. 2006c], though some previous
studies have informally used similar models, e.g., [Dinur and Nissim 2003]. The Laplace mecha-
nism [Dwork et al. 2006c] is the first generic mechanism for enforcing differential privacy, which
works when the output domain is a multi-dimensional Euclidean space. McSherry and Talwar
[McSherry and Talwar 2007] propose the exponential mechanism, which applies to any problem
with a measurable output space. The generality of the exponential mechanism makes it an impor-
tant tool in the design of many other differentially private algorithms, e.g., [Cormode et al. 2012;
Xu et al. 2012; Xu et al. 2013; McSherry and Talwar 2007].
The original definition of differential privacy is ǫ-differential privacy, which focuses on provid-
ing a strong and rigorous definition of privacy. Besides this, another popular definition is (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, which can be seen as an approximate version of ǫ-differential privacy. In many
applications, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy provides a similarly strong privacy definition, while enabling
simpler and/or more accurate algorithms. One basic mechanism for enforcing (ǫ, δ)-differential pri-
vacy is the Gaussian mechanism, which injects Gaussian noise to the query results calibrated to
the L2 sensitivity of the queries [Dwork et al. 2006a]. [Hardt and Roth 2012] employ k Gaussian
measurements strategy to compute the low rank approximations of large matrices. However, (ǫ,
δ)-differential privacy might be unsatisfactory in certain situations. For example, [De 2012] demon-
strate that (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is weaker than ǫ-differential privacy in terms of mutual infor-
mation even when δ is negligible. The proposed solution applies to both definitions of differential
privacy. We present details of these two privacy definitions in Section 3.
Linear query processing is of particular interest in both the theory and database communities,
due to its wide range of applications. To minimize the error of linear queries under differential
privacy requirements, several methods try to build a synopsis of the original database, such as
Fourier transformations [Rastogi and Nath 2010], wavelets [Xiao et al. 2010] and hierarchical trees
[Hay et al. 2010]. The compressive mechanism [Li et al. 2011] reduces the amount of noise neces-
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sary to satisfy differential privacy, for datasets with a sparse representation. By publishing a noisy
synopsis under ǫ-differential privacy, these methods are capable of answering an arbitrary number
of linear queries. However, most of these methods obtain good accuracy only when the query selec-
tion criterion is a continuous range; meanwhile, since these methods are not workload-aware, their
performance for a specific workload tends to be sub-optimal.
Workload-aware algorithms address this problem, which optimize the overall accuracy of a set
of given linear queries. This work falls into this category. Notable workload-aware methods include
(i) Multiplicative Weights / Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) [Hardt et al. 2012],(ii) the Matrix
Mechanism [Li et al. 2010] and (iii) the Adaptive Mechanism [Li and Miklau 2012]. MWEM pub-
lishes a synthetic dataset optimized towards the given linear query set. In particular, it provides a
beautiful theoretical bound on the maximum error of the given queries, which grows sublinearly to
the number of records in the dataset, and logarithmically with the number of queries. In practice,
however, this bound tends to be loose as it is derived from worst-case scenarios. Meanwhile, the
target problem of MWEM is different from ours, as we focus on answering a given set of linear
queries rather than publishing synthetic data. Nevertheless, MWEM can be applied to our problem,
and we compare it against the proposed solution in the experiments. The Matrix Mechanism and the
Adaptive Mechanism share some common features as the proposed solution, and we explain them
in detail in Section 2.2. 2.2. It is worth mentioning that as our experiments shows, the proposed
solution outperforms all previous methods in terms of overall error, on a variety of datasets and
workload types.
Recently, [Nikolov et al. 2013] proposes a workload decomposition method that injects corre-
lated Gaussian noise to the query results to satisfy (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. They prove that their
solution provides anO((logm)2) approximation to the optimal mechanism, where m is the number
of queries. However, this method is infeasible in practice, since it involves computing minimum
enclosing ellipsoids (MEE), for which the current best algorithm takes mO(m)n time, where n is
the number of unit counts. [Nikolov et al. 2013] suggests using approximation method for comput-
ing MEE, e.g. Khachiyan’s algorithm [Todd and Yildirim 2007]. This approximation algorithm still
takes high order polynomial time to converge, which makes it prohibitively expensive for practical
applications.
Several theoretical studies have derived lower bounds for the noise level for processing linear
queries under differential privacy [Dinur and Nissim 2003; Hardt and Talwar 2010]. Notably, Dinur
and Nissim [Dinur and Nissim 2003] prove that any perturbation mechanism with maximal noise of
scaleO(n) cannot possibly preserve personal privacy, if the adversary is allowed to ask all possible
linear queries, and has exponential computation capacity. By reducing the computation capacity of
the adversary to polynomial-bounded Turing machines, they show that an error scale Ω(
√
n) is nec-
essary to protect any individual’ privacy. More recently, Hardt and Talwar [Hardt and Talwar 2010]
have significantly tightened the error lower bound for answering a batch of linear queries under
differential privacy. Given a batch of m linear queries, they prove that any ǫ-differential privacy
mechanism leads to squared error of at least Ω(ǫ−2m3Vol(W )), where Vol(W ) is the volume of
the convex body obtained by transforming the L1-unit ball into m-dimensional space using the
linear transformations in the workload W . This paper extends their analysis to low-rank workload
matrices.
Another related line of research concerns answering queries interactively under differential pri-
vacy. In this setting, the system process queries one at a time, without knowing any future query.
Clearly, this problem is more difficult that the non-interactive setting described so far, where the
system knows all queries in the workload in advance. Most notably, Hardt et al. propose the Private
Multiplicative Weights Mechanism (PMWM) [Hardt and Rothblum 2010], whose error is asymp-
totically optimal with respect to the number of queries answered. The MWEM method described
above [Hardt et al. 2012] applies similar ideas to the non-interactive setting. Besides PMWM,
Hardt et al. [Hardt and Talwar 2010] propose the K-norm Mechanism whose error level almost
reaches the lower bound derived in the same paper. Roth et al. introduce the Median Mechanism
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[Roth and Roughgarden 2010] for answering arbitrary queries interactively. However, both the K-
norm Mechanism and the Median Mechanism rely on uniform sampling in a high-dimensional con-
vex body [Dyer et al. 1991], which theoretically takes polynomial time, but is usually too expensive
to be applied in practice.
Besides linear queries, differential privacy is also applicable to more complex queries in various
research areas, due to its strong privacy guarantee. In the field of data mining, Friedman and Schus-
ter [Friedman and Schuster 2010] propose the first algorithm for building a decision tree under dif-
ferential privacy. Mohammed et al. [Mohammed et al. 2011] study the same problem, and propose
an improved solution based on a generalization strategy coupled with the exponential mechanism.
Ding et al. [Ding et al. 2011] investigate the problem of differentially private data cube publication.
They present a randomized materialized view selection algorithm, which reduces the overall error,
and preserves data consistency.
In the database literature, a plethora of methods have been proposed to optimize the accuracy of
differentially private query processing. A tutorial on database-related differential privacy technolo-
gies can be found in [Yang et al. 2012]. Cormode et al. [Cormode et al. 2012] investigate the prob-
lem of multi-dimensional indexing under differential privacy, with the novel idea of assigning differ-
ent amounts of privacy budget to different levels of the index. Peng et al. [Peng et al. 2012] propose
the DP-tree, which obtains improved accurate for higher dimensional data. Xu et al. [Xu et al. 2012;
Xu et al. 2013] optimize the procedure of building a differentially private histogram, whose method
combines dynamic programming for optimal histogram computation and the exponential mecha-
nism. [Li et al. 2012] study the problem of how to perform frequent itemset mining on transaction
databases while satisfying differential privacy, with the novel approach of constructing a basis set
and then using it to find the most frequent patterns.
In addition, differential privacy for modeling security in social networks has also received much
attention in recent literature. [Rastogi et al. 2009] considers answering subgraph counting queries
in a social network. Their solution assumes a Bayesian adversary whose prior is drawn from a dis-
tribution. They compute a high probability upper bound on the local sensitivity of the data and then
answer by adding noise proportional to that bound. [Hay et al. 2009] shows how to privately approx-
imate the degree distribution in the edge adjacency model of a graph. Also, [Sala et al. 2011] de-
velop a differentially private graph model based on dk-series reconstruction. Their approach mainly
extracts a graph’s detailed structure into degree correlation statistics and inject noise into the result-
ing dataset and generates a synthetic graph.
Lastly, differential privacy is also becoming a hot topic in the machine learning commu-
nity, especially for learning tasks involving sensitive information, e.g., medical records. In
[Chaudhuri et al. 2011], Chaudhuri et al. propose a generic differentially private learning algorithm,
which requires strong convexity of the objective function. Rubinstein et al. [Rubinstein et al. 2012]
study the problem of SVM learning on sensitive data, and propose an algorithm to perturb the kernel
matrix with performance guarantees, when the gradient of the loss function satisfies the Lipschitz
continuity property. Zhang et al. propose functional mechanism and for a large class of optimization-
based analyses [Zhang et al. 2012]. Later, they propose the PrivGene framework, which combines
genetic algorithms and an enhanced version of exponential mechanism for differentially private
model fitting [Zhang et al. 2013]. General differential privacy techniques have also been applied
to real systems, such as network trace analysis [McSherry and Mahajan 2010] and private recom-
mender systems [McSherry and Mironov 2009].
2.2. Matrix Mechanism and Adaptive Mechanism
In the seminal work of [Li et al. 2010], Li et al. propose the matrix mechanism (MM), which for-
malizes the intuition that a batch of correlated linear queries can be answered more accurately under
ǫ-differential privacy, by processing a different set of queries (called the strategy) and combining
their results. Specifically, given a workload of linear counting queries, MM first constructs a work-
load matrix W of size m×n, where m is the number of queries, and n is the number of unit counts.
The construction of the workload matrix is elaborated further in Section 3. After that, MM searches
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for a strategy matrix A of size r×n, where r is a positive integer. Intuitively, A corresponds to an-
other set of linear queries, such that every query in W can be expressed as a linear combination of
the queries in A. The matrix mechanism then answers the queries in A under ǫ-differential privacy,
and subsequently uses their noisy results to answer queries in W .
The main challenge for applying the matrix mechanism to practical workloads is to identify an
appropriate strategy matrix A. Ref. [Li et al. 2010] provides two algorithms for this purpose. The
first, based on iteratively solving a pair of related semidefinite programs, incursO(m3n3) computa-
tional overhead, which is prohibitively expensive even for moderately large values of m and n. The
second solution (called approximate matrix mechanism (AMM)) computes an L2 approximation of
the optimal strategy matrix A. This method, though faster than the first one, still requires high CPU
costs and memory consumption, and scales poorly with the domain size and query set cardinality.
In order to test the approximate matrix mechanism with large data and query sets in our experi-
ments, we have devised an improved solution, which we call the exponential smoothing mechanism
(ESM), based on the problem formulation of approximate matrix mechanism in [Li et al. 2010].
ESM is at least as accurate as the method in [Li et al. 2010], and yet much more efficient. Hence, in
our experiments we use ESM in place of AMM. Appendix A.1 provides details of ESM.
There are, however, two main drawbacks of ESM (and also vanilla AMM). First, the L2 approx-
imation of the optimal strategy matrix often has poor quality. In fact, due to this problem, in our
experiments we found that under ǫ-differential privacy, the accuracy of ESM is often no better than
the naive solution NOD that injects noise directly into the unit counts. A second and more subtle
problem is that the formulation of the optimization program in AMM involves matrix inverse oper-
ators, which can cause numerical instability when the final solution (i.e., the strategy matrix) is of
low rank, as explained in Appendix A.1. The proposed low-rank mechanism avoids both problems,
and achieves significantly higher result accuracy as shown in our experiments.
The idea of matrix mechanism naturally extends to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, using the Gaussian
mechanism instead of the Laplace mechanism as the fundamental building block. In this case, the
optimization program is defined using L2 form, and the AMM formulation is equivalent to that of
MM, meaning that AMM and ESM now solve the exact optimization program. Hence, in theory,
AMM can obtain optimal results. However, in practice, both ESM and the AMM implementation
in [Li et al. 2010] often fail to converge to the optimal strategy matrix, due to numerical instability
incurred by the matrix inverse operator in the AMM formulation.
Recently, [Li and Miklau 2012] Li et al. propose another implementation of AMM, called the
adaptive mechanism (AM). For any given workloadW , AM attempts to find the best strategy matrix
by computing the optimal nonnegative weights for the eigenvectors of the workload matrixW . Since
the strategy matrix may have one or more columns whose L2-norm are less than the sensitivity, they
refine the strategy matrix by appending some completing columns to the candidate strategy matrix
without raising the sensitivity. Therefore, this post-processing step can reduce the expected error.
AM incurs two serious drawbacks. First, it involves solving a complicated semidefinite program,
and it is not known whether their solution to the program converges to the optimal solution. Second
and more importantly, such multistep strategy in AM does not offer any guarantee on optimality. The
proposed method LRM is free from these problems, and obtains significantly better performance as
we show in the experiments. Appendix A.2 provides details of AM.
3. PRELIMINARIES
We focus on answering a batch of linear counting queries Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qm} over a sensitive
databaseD. Each query qi ∈ Q is a linear combination of unit counts in the data domain, denoted as
x1, x2, . . . , xn. In the example of Figure 1, the sensitive database D contains records correspond-
ing to individual HIV+ patients; each unit count is the number of such patients in a state of the
US; each query in the example is a linear combination of these state-level patient counts. Our goal
is to answer Q with minimum overall error, while satisfying differential privacy. In particular, we
consider two definitions of differential privacy, namely ǫ-differential privacy (i.e., the original def-
inition of differential privacy) and (ǫ,δ)-differential privacy (a popular formulation of approximate
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Table I. Summary of frequent notations
Symbol Meaning
D input database
n number of unit counts
Q input query set
m number of queries in Q
W workload matrix, i.e., the matrix representation of Q
B,L a decomposition of W satisfying W ≈ B · L
s rank of workload matrix W
r number of columns in B (also number of rows in L)
Q(D) exact answer of Q on database D
∆(Q) L1 sensitivity of Q
Θ(Q) L2 sensitivity of Q
ǫ, δ privacy parameters
ξ, η utility parameters
κ(W ) generalized condition number of matrix W
ρ(W ) ρ-coherence of matrix W
|||X|||1 maximum absolute column sum of matrix X
|||X|||2 spectral norm, maximum singular value of matrix X
|||X|||∞ maximum absolute row sum of matrix X
‖X‖∗ nuclear norm, sum of the singular values of matrix X
‖X‖F Frobenius norm, square root of the sum of squared elements of matrix X
differential privacy). Our solutions use the Laplace mechanism (resp., the Gaussian mechanism) as a
fundamental building block to enforce ǫ- (resp., (ǫ, δ)-) differential privacy. In the following, Section
3.1 presents the definition of ǫ-differential privacy and the Laplace mechanism. Section 3.2 covers
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy and the Gaussian mechanism. Section 3.3 describes naive approaches to
answering a batch of linear counting queries. Section 3.4 explains important properties of low-rank
matrices that are used in our solutions. Table I summarizes frequently used notations throughout the
paper.
3.1. ǫ-Differential Privacy and the Laplace Mechanism
The basic idea behind the privacy guarantee of differential privacy is the indistinguishability be-
tween neighbor databases. Two databases D and D′ are called neighbor databases, iff. D′ can be
obtained by adding or removing exactly one record from D. In the example of Figure 1, a neighbor
database can be obtained by removing an individual from the original data, or by adding another
one. For linear counting queries, the essential difference between two neighbor databases D and D′
is that they differ on exactly one unit count, by exactly one. Formally, let {x1, x2, . . . , xn} be the
set of unit counts corresponding to D and {x′1, x′2, . . . , x′n} be the unit counts for D′. Then, there
exists an i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, such that xj = x′j for all j 6= i, and |xi − x′i| = 1.
Given a set of queries Q, a randomized mechanism M for answering Q satisfies ǫ-differential
privacy, iff. for every possible pair of neighbor databases D and D′, the following inequality holds:
∀R : Pr(M(Q,D) = R) ≤ eǫ Pr(M(Q,D′) = R) (1)
where R is any possible output of M , and M(Q,D) (resp. M(Q,D′)) is the output of M given
query set Q and input databaseD (resp.,D′). This inequality indicates that given an outputR of M ,
the adversary can only have limited confidence for inferring whether the input database is D or D′,
regardless of his/her background knowledge. Since D and D′ can be any two neighbor databases
that differ in any record, the above inequality also limits the adversary’s confidence for inferring the
presence or absence of a record in the input database; hence, it provides plausible deniablity to any
individual involved in the sensitive data.
The Laplace mechanism [Dwork et al. 2006c] is a fundamental solution for enforcing ǫ-
differential privacy, based on the concept of L1 sensitivity. Given a query set Q, its L1 sensitivity
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∆(Q) is the maximumL1 distance between the exact results of Q on any pair of neighbor databases
D and D′, Formally, we have:
∆(Q) = max
D,D′
‖Q(D), Q(D′)‖1 (2)
Note that in the above equation,D and D′ can be any pair of neighbor databases. Hence, ∆(Q) is
a property of the query set Q and the data domain, and it does not depend upon the actual sensitive
data D. In the example of Figure 1, the L1 sensitivity of a single query q1 = xNY + xNJ + xCA +
xWA is 1, because any two neighbor databasesD andD′ differ on only one unit count (which can be
one of xNY , xNJ , xCA or xWA) by exactly 1. If we include q2 = xNY +xNJ and q3 = xCA+xWA
to the query set Q, the L1 sensitivity of Q = {q1, q2, q3} is 2, because a change of 1 on any of xNY ,
xNJ , xCA or xWA affects the result of q1 by 1, and either one (but not both) of q2 and q3 by 1,
leading to a L1 distance of 2.
Given a database D and a query set Q, the Laplace mechanism (denoted as MLap) outputs a
randomized result set R that follow the Laplace distribution with mean Q(D) and scale ∆(Q)ǫ , i.e.,
Pr(MLap(Q,D) = R) ∝ exp
(
ǫ
∆(Q)
‖R−Q(D)‖1
)
(3)
This is equivalent to adding independent Laplace noise to the exact result of each query in Q, i.e.,
M(Q,D) = Q(D) + Lap
(
∆(Q)
ǫ
)m
, where m is the number of queries in Q, and Lap
(
∆(Q)
ǫ
)
is
a random variable following zero-mean Laplace distribution with scale λ = ∆(Q)ǫ . The probability
density function of zero-mean Laplace distribution is:
f(x) =
1
2λ
exp
(
−‖x‖1
λ
)
(4)
According to properties of the Laplace distribution, the variance of Lap(λ) is 2λ2 = 2∆(Q)
2
ǫ2 .
Since the Laplace noise injected to each of the m query results is independent, the overall expected
squared error of the query answers obtained by the Laplace mechanism is 2m∆(Q)
2
ǫ2 . In our running
example in Figure 1, to answer the query set Q = {q1 = xNY + xNJ + xCA + xWA, q2 =
xNY + xNJ , q3 = xCA + xWA} under ǫ-differential privacy, a direct application of the Laplace
mechanism injects independent, zero-mean Laplace noise of scale 2ǫ to the exact result of each of
q1, q2 and q3, since the L1 sensitivity for this set of queries is 2, as discussed in Section 1. The
overall squared error for Q is thus 2×3×22ǫ2 =
24
ǫ2 .
3.2. (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy and the Gaussian Mechanism
ǫ-differential privacy can be difficult to enforce, especially for queries with high L1 sensitivity, or
those whose L1 sensitivity is difficult to analyze. Hence, relaxed versions of ǫ-differential privacy
have been studied in the past, among which a popular definition is the (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, also
called approximate differential privacy. This definition involves an additional parameter δ, which is
a non-negative real number controlling how closely this definition approximates ǫ-differential pri-
vacy. Formally, let Range(M) be the set of all possible outputs of a mechanism M . A randomized
mechanism M satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, iff. for any two neighbor databases D and D′, the
following holds:
∀R ⊆ Range(M) : Pr(M(Q,D) ∈ R) ≤ eǫ Pr(M(Q,D′) ∈ R) + δ (5)
where R is any set of possible results of M . It can be derived that when δ = 0, (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy is equivalent to ǫ-differential privacy. Accordingly, since δ is non-negative, any mechanism
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that satisfies ǫ-differential privacy also satisfies (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy for any value of δ. When
δ > 0, (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy relaxes ǫ-differential privacy by ignoring outputs of M with very
small probability (controlled by parameter δ). In other words, an (ǫ, δ)-differentially private mech-
anism satisfies ǫ-differential privacy with a probability controlled by δ.
A basic mechanism for enforcing (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is the Gaussian mechanism
[Dwork et al. 2006b], which involves the concept of L2 sensitivity. For any two neighbor databases
D and D′, the L2 sensitivity Θ(Q) of a query set Q is defined as:
Θ(Q) = max
D,D′
‖Q(D), Q(D′)‖2 (6)
In the running example shown in Figure 1, the L2 sensitivity for the query set Q = {q1 = xNY +
xNJ+xCA+xWA, q2 = xNY +xNJ , q3 = xCA+xWA} is
√
2, since the exact results of q1 (as well
as one of q2 and q3) differ by at most 1 for any two neighbor databases, leading to an L2 sensitivity
of
√
12 + 12 =
√
2. Similar to L1 sensitivity, the L2 sensitivity Θ(Q) depends on the data domain
D and the query set Q, not the actual data. Given a database D and a query set Q, the Gaussian
mechanism (denoted by MGau) outputs a random result that follows the Gaussian distribution with
mean Q(D) and magnitude σ = Θ(Q)h(ǫ,δ) , where h(ǫ, δ) =
ǫ√
8 ln(2/δ)
. This is equivalent to adding
m-dimensional independent Gaussian noise Gau
(
Θ(Q)
h(ǫ,δ)
)m
, in which Gau
(
Θ(Q)
h(ǫ,δ)
)
is a random
variable following a zero-mean Gaussian distribution with scale σ = Θ(Q)h(ǫ,δ) . The probability density
function of zero-mean Gaussian distribution is:
g(x) =
√
1
2πσ2
exp
(
−‖x‖
2
2
2σ2
)
(7)
According to properties of the Gaussian distribution, the variance of Gau(σ) is σ2 = Θ(Q)
2
h(ǫ,δ)2 .
Since independent Gaussian noise is injected to each of the m query results, the total expected
squared error for the query set is mΘ(Q)
2
h(ǫ,δ)2 . In our running example in Figure 1, to answer the query
set Q = {q1 = xNY + xNJ + xCA + xWA, q2 = xNY + xNJ , q3 = xCA + xWA} under (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy, a direct application of the Gaussian mechanism injects independent, zero-mean
Laplace noise of scale
√
2
h(ǫ,δ) to the exact result of each of q1, q2 and q3, since the L2 sensitivity
for this set of queries is
√
2, according to Equation (6). The overall squared error for Q is thus
3×(√2)2
(h(ǫ,δ))2 =
48 ln(2/δ)
ǫ2 .
3.3. Naive Solutions for Answering a Batch of Linear Counting Queries
This paper focuses on answering a batch of linear counting queries, each of which is a lin-
ear combination of the unit counts of the input database D. Formally, given a weight vector
(w1, w2, . . . , wn)
T ∈ Rn, a linear counting query can be expressed as:
q(D) = w1x1 + w2x2 + . . .+ wnxn
We aim to answer a batch of m linear queries, Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qm}. The query set Q thus can
be represented by a workload matrix W with m rows and n columns. Each entry Wij in W is the
weight in query qi on the j-th unit count xj . Since we do not use any other information of the input
database D besides the unit counts, in the following we abuse the notation by using D to represent
the vector of unit counts, i.e., D = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)T ∈ Rn. Hence, the query batch Q can be
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answered by:
Q(D) = WD =

∑
j
W1jxj , . . . ,
∑
j
Wmjxj


T
∈ Rm×1
Two naive solutions for enforcing differential privacy on a query batch are as follows.
Noise on data (NOD). The main idea of NOD is to add noise to each unit count. Then, the set of
noisy unit counts are published, which can be used to answer any linear counting query. Because
two neighbor databases differ on exactly one unit count, by exactly 1, both the L1 and the L2
sensitivity for the set of unit counts is 1, according to their respective definitions. NOD employs
the Laplace mechanism to enforce ǫ-differential privacy (or the Gaussian mechanism to enforce (ǫ,
δ)-differential privacy) on the published unit counts, and then combines the noisy unit counts to
answer the query batch Q. Let MNOD,ǫ and MNOD,(ǫ,δ) denote the NOD mechanism for enforcing
ǫ-differential privacy and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, respectively. We have:
MNOD,ǫ(Q,D) = W
(
D + Lap
(
1
ǫ
)n)
MNOD,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) = W
(
D +Gau
(
1
h(ǫ, δ)
)n)
where h(ǫ, δ) = ǫ√
8 ln(2/δ)
as in the Gaussian mechanism.
Based on the analysis of the Laplace and Gaussian mechanisms, the expected squared error for
MNOD,ǫ and MNOD,(ǫ,δ) is 2ǫ2
∑
i,jW
2
ij and 1(h(ǫ,δ))2
∑
i,jW
2
ij , respectively. For both privacy def-
initions, the error of NOD is proportional to the squared sum of the entries in W .
Noise on results (NOR). NOR simply applies the Laplace mechanism (for ǫ-differential privacy)
or the Gaussian mechanism (for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy) directly on the query set Q. Recall that
each query qi ∈ Q is a linear combination of the unit counts, i.e., qi =
∑
jWijxj . Meanwhile, two
neighbor databases differ on exactly one unit count, by exactly 1. Therefore, the sensitivity (both L1
andL2) of qi is maxjWij , i.e., the maximum unit count weight in qi. RegardingQ, its L1 sensitivity
is ∆(Q) = maxj
∑
i |Wij |, i.e., the highest column absolute sum [Li et al. 2010]. Similarly, its L2
sensitivity is Θ(Q) = maxj
√∑
iW
2
ij , i.e., the highest column L2 norm value[Li et al. 2010].
Thus, MNOR,ǫ and MNOR,(ǫ,δ) output the following results.
MNOR,ǫ(Q,D) = WD + Lap
(
∆(Q)
ǫ
)m
MNOR,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) = WD +Gau
(
Θ(Q)
h(ǫ, δ)
)m
where ∆(Q) = maxj
∑
i |Wij |, Θ(Q) = maxj
√∑
iW
2
ij , and h(ǫ, δ) = ǫ√8 ln(2/δ) .
Similar to the analysis of the Laplace and the Gaussian mechanisms, the expected squared er-
ror of the MNOR,ǫ on query Q is 2m∆(Q)
2
ǫ2 =
2mmaxj
∑
iW
2
ij
ǫ2 , and the expected squared error of
MNOR,(ǫ,δ) is mΘ(Q)
2
h(ǫ,δ)2 =
mmaxj
∑
iW
2
ij
h(ǫ,δ)2 . An interesting observation is that under (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, NOR obtains lower expected squared error than NOD, iff.mmaxj
∑
iW
2
ij <
∑
j
∑
iW
2
ij .
Note that when m ≥ n, this inequality can never hold, implying that NOR is more effective for
when the number of queries m is smaller than the number of unit counts n.
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3.4. Low-Rank Matrices and Matrix Norms
The rank of a real-value matrix W is the number of non-zero singular values obtained by perform-
ing singular value decomposition (SVD) of W . SVD decomposesW of size m×n into the product
of three matrices: W = UΣV . U and V are row-wise and column-wise orthogonal matrices respec-
tively, and Σ is a diagonal matrix with positive real diagonal values, which are the singular values
of W . Let s be the number of such singular values, i.e., the rank of W . Then, Matrices U , Σ, and V
are of sizes m× s, s× s, and s× n respectively. SVD guarantees that s ≤ min{m,n}.
A matrix W of size m × n whose rank is less than min{m,n} is called a low-rank matrix. This
happens when the rows and columns of W are correlated. In the running example of Figure 1, the
workload matrix corresponding to the query set Q = {q1 = xNY + xNJ + xCA + xWA, q2 =
xNY + xNJ , q3 = xCA + xWA} is a low-rank matrix, since the queries in Q are correlated (i.e.,
q1 = q2 + q3, and the unit counts are also correlated (e.g., xNY and xNJ ). The main idea of the
proposed low-rank mechanism is to exploit the low-rank property of the workload matrix to reduce
the necessary amount of noise required to satisfy differential privacy.
An important concept used in the proposed solution is the matrix norm, which is an extension
of the notion of vector norms to matrices. Two common definitions of the matrix norm are: (i)
Entrywise norm, which treats a matrix W of size m×n simply as a vector of size m×n consisting
of all entries of W , and applies one of the vector norm definitions. For example, applying the
L2-norm to all entries in W obtains ‖W‖2 = (
∑m
i=1
∑n
j=1 |Wij |2)
1/2
, which is also called the
Frobenius norm, written as ‖W‖F . (ii) Induced norm (or Operator norm), defined by |||W |||p =
maxx 6=0 ‖Wx‖p/‖x‖p, where x is a vector of size n, and ‖x‖p is the Lp norm of x. Notably,
|||W |||1 is simply the maximum absolute column sum of W , and |||W |||∞ is simply the maximum
absolute row sum of the matrix W .
4. WORKLOAD DECOMPOSITION
Recall that the example in Figure 1 shows that sometimes it is best to answer a batch of linear
counting queries Q indirectly, by first answering a set of intermediate linear counting queries under
differential privacy, and combine their results to answer Q. The proposed low-rank mechanism
(LRM) follows this idea. Specifically, given a workload matrix W corresponding to the query set
Q, LRM decomposes W into the product of two matrices W = BL. B is of size m × r and L is
of size r × n. Here, r is a parameter to be determined which specifies the number of intermediate
queries;L corresponds to the set of intermediate linear counting queries to answer under differential
privacy; B indicates how the results of these intermediate queries are combined to answer Q. The
main challenge lies in how to choose the best decomposition that minimizes the overall error of Q,
as there is a vast search space for possible decompositions. In this section, we model the search
for the optimal matrix decomposition as a constrained optimization program, which is solved in
the next section. For the ease of presentation, we focus on ǫ-differential privacy in this and the next
section, and defer the discussion of (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy until Section 6. In addition, we provide
asymptotic error bounds for LRM in Appendix B.
In the following, Section 4.1 formalize LRM and the optimization program of workload decom-
position. Section 4.2 analyzes the result utility of LRM with the optimal workload decomposition,
and discusses the selection of the privacy parameter ǫ. Finally, Section 4.3 presents a relaxed opti-
mization program for workload decomposition which can further improve the accuracy of LRM for
certain workloads.
4.1. Optimization Program Formulation
We first formalize LRM under ǫ-differential privacy. Given W and its decomposition W = BL,
LRM first applies the Laplace mechanism to the intermediate queries specified by L. Let ∆(L)
denote the L1 sensitivity of these intermediate queries. Similar to the case of NOR discussed in
Section 3.3, ∆(L) is the maximum sum of absolute values of a column in L, which is:
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Optimizing Batch Linear Queries under Exact and Approximate Differential Privacy A:13
∆(L) = max
j
∑
i
|Lij |
Applying the Laplace mechanism, we obtain the noisy results of the intermediate queries:
LD + Lap
(
∆(L)
ǫ
)r
where D denotes the vector of unit counts. Next, LRM multiplies matrix B with the noisy
intermediate results, which essentially recombines the intermediate results to answer Q. Let
MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) denote LRM under ǫ-differential privacy, we have:
MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) = B
(
LD + Lap
(
∆(L)
ǫ
)r)
(8)
Since W = BL, we have Q(D) = WD = BLD. Hence, the output MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) can be
seen as the sum of two components: BLD and B · Lap
(
∆(L)
ǫ
)
. The former is the exact result of
Q, and the latter is the noise added in order to satisfy differential privacy. Next we analyze the error
of LRM. First we define the scale of a decomposition, as follows.
Definition 4.1. Scale of a workload decomposition. Given a workload decomposition W =
BL, its scale Φ(B) is the squared sum of the entries in B, i.e., Φ(B) =
∑
i,j B
2
ij .
Meanwhile, we call ∆(L) the L1 sensitivity of the decomposition W = BL. The following
lemma shows that the expected squared error of LRM is linear to the scale of the decomposition,
and quadratic to the L1 sensitivity of the decomposition.
LEMMA 4.2. The expected squared error of MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) using decomposition W = BL is
2Φ(B)∆(L)2
ǫ2 .
PROOF. According to Equation (8),MLRM,ǫ(Q,D)−Q(D) = B ·Lap
(
∆(L)
ǫ
)r
. The expected
squared error of the mechanism is thus
(∑
ij B
2
ij
)
2(∆(L))2
ǫ2 . Since Φ(B) =
∑
ij B
2
ij , the error can
be rewritten as 2Φ(B)(∆(L))
2
ǫ2 .
Therefore, to find the best workload decomposition, it suffice to solve the optimal B and L that
minimize Φ(B) (∆(L))2, while satisfying W = BL. However, this optimization program is dif-
ficult to solve, because (i) the objective function involves the product of Φ(B) and the square of
∆(L), and (ii) ∆(L) may not be differentiable. To address this problem, we first prove an important
property of workload decomposition, which implies that the exact value of ∆(L) is not important.
LEMMA 4.3. Given a workload decomposition W = BL, we can always construct another
decomposition W = B′L′ satisfying (i) ∆(L′) = 1 and (ii) (B′, L′) lead to the same expected
squared error of MLRM,ǫ as (B, L), i.e.,
Φ(B)∆(L)2 = Φ(B′) (∆(L′))2 = Φ(B′)
PROOF. We obtain B′ and L′ by B′ = ∆(L)B, L′ = 1∆(L)L. Based on the definition of L1
sensitivity, we have
∆(L′) = max
j
∑
i
|L′ij | = max
j
∑
i
∣∣∣∣ Lij∆(L)
∣∣∣∣ = 1∆(L)∆(L) = 1
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Meanwhile, according to Definition 4.1, we have:
Φ(B′) =
∑
ij
(B′ij)
2 =
∑
ij
∆(L)2(Bij)
2 = Φ(B)∆(L)2
This leads to the conclusion of the lemma.
It follows from the above lemma is that there must be an optimal decomposition with L1 sensi-
tivity equal to 1, because we can always apply Lemma 4.3 to transform an optimal decomposition
whoseL1 sensitivity is not 1 to another optimal decomposition whoseL1 sensitivity is 1. Therefore,
it suffices to fix ∆(L) to 1 in the optimization program. Meanwhile, according to properties of the
matrix trace, we have Φ(B) = tr(BTB). Thus, we arrive at the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.4. Given the workload W , a workload decomposition W = BL minimizes the
expected squared error of the queries, if (B,L) is the optimal solution to the following program:
min
B,L
1
2
tr(BTB)
s.t. W = BL
∀j
r∑
i
|Lij | ≤ 1
(9)
The constant factor 1/2 in the objective function above simplifies the notations in the following
sections; it does not affect the optimal solution of the program. We omit the proof since it is already
clear from the discussions above. Solving the above optimization program is rather difficult, since
it involves a non-linear objective function and complex constraints. We present a relaxation of the
problem in Section 4.3, and our solution in Section 5.
4.2. Utility Analysis and Budget Selection
In practice, users are often unsure about how to set the privacy parameter ǫ involved in ǫ-differential
privacy. Instead, setting the desired utility level of the query results is much more intuitive. Given the
user-specified utility, this subsection derives the smallest ǫ value for LRM that satisfies the utility
requirement. Note that smaller values of ǫ corresponds to stronger privacy protection. We use a
common definition of query result utility called (ξ, η)-usefulness [Blum et al. 2008], as follows.
Definition 4.5. Given a mechanism M , query set Q, sensitive data D, and parameters ξ > 0
and 0 < η < 1, we say that M is (ξ, η)-useful with respect to Q and D under the ‖ · ‖∗-norm if the
following inequality holds:
Pr (‖M(Q,D)−Q(D)‖∗ ≥ ξ) ≤ η
where ‖ · ‖∗-norm can be any vector norm definition. In our analysis, we consider the ‖ · ‖1-norm
and the ‖ · ‖∞-norm.
Given user specified values of ξ and η, we now derive the minimum value for ǫ with which LRM
achieves (ξ, η)-usefulness. The derivation uses Markov’s inequality and the Chernoff bound, as
follows.
LEMMA 4.6. Markov’s Inequality and the Chernoff Bound [Billingsley 2012]. Given a non-
negative random variable X and t > 0, the following inequality holds:
Pr(X ≥ t) ≤ E[X ]
t
Moreover, for any s ≥ 0, we have:
Pr(X ≥ t) = Pr(esX ≥ est) ≤ E[e
sX ]
est
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The minimum ǫ value is given in the following theorem.
THEOREM 4.7. Utility of LRM under ǫ-differential privacy. Given query set Q, database D,
and user-specified parameters ξ > 0 and 0 < η < 1, (i) MLRM,ǫ with the optimal decomposi-
tion W = BL solved from Program (9) returns (ξ, η)-useful results of Q on D under the ‖ · ‖1-
norm, when the privacy parameter ǫ satisfies ǫ ≥ (2|||B|||1(s · ln 2− ln η)) /ξ. (ii) Meanwhile,
MLRM,ǫ with the optimal decomposition achieves (ξ, η)-usefulness under the ‖ · ‖∞-norm, when
ǫ ≥
(
2|||B|||∞(
∑s
i=1 ln(
i
i−0.5 )− ln η)
)
/ξ.
PROOF. (i) We first prove the utility of LRM under the ‖ · ‖1-norm. Let X be the Laplace noise
vector injected to the results of intermediate queries corresponding to L. We have:
‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖1 = ‖B(LD +X)−WD‖1
= ‖B ·X‖1 = |||B ·X |||1 ≤ |||B|||1 · |||X |||1 = |||B|||1 · ‖X‖1
According to the Laplace mechanism, X1, X2, · · · , Xr are i.i.d. random variables following the
zero-mean Laplace distribution with scale ∆(L)/ǫ. Since L is obtained by solving Program (9),
we have ∆(L) = 1. Therefore, the scale of each of the Laplace variable Xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ r is 1/ǫ.
According to properties of the Laplace distribution, |Xi| follows the exponential distribution with
rate parameter equal to ǫ. Let Y = ‖X‖1 = |X1| + |X2| + · · · + |Xr|. Then, according to prop-
erties of the exponential distribution, Y follows the Erlang distribution. Specifically, the probability
distribution function of Y is:
Pr (Y = x) =
ǫrxr−1e−ǫx
(r − 1)! dx
For any positive number t such that E[etY ] exists, we have:
E[etY ] =
∫ ∞
0
etx · ǫ
rxr−1e−ǫx
(r − 1)! dx = (1−
t
ǫ
)−r, t < ǫ
Moreover, for any real number c, according to Lemma 4.6, we have:
Pr(Y > c) = Pr(etY > etc) ≤ E[e
tY ]
ect
=
(1− tǫ)−r
ect
Setting t = ǫ2 and c =
ξ
|||B|||1 , we obtain:
Pr(Y >
ξ
|||B|||1 ) ≤
(12 )
−r
e
ξǫ
2|||B|||1
Therefore, we have:
‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖1 ≤ |||B|||1 · Y
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖1 ≥ ξ) ≤ Pr(Y ≥ ξ|||B|||1 ) ≤
( 12 )
−r
e
ξǫ
2|||B|||1
(10)
When ǫ ≥ (2|||B|||1 (r · ln 2− ln η)) /ξ, the above probability is thus bound by η. This finishes the
proof for claim (i) in the theorem.
(ii) Next we focus on the ‖ · ‖∞-norm. Let X denote the same meaning as in the proof of part (i).
Then, we have:
‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ = ‖B ·X‖∞ ≤ |||B|||∞ · ‖X‖∞
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The inequality above holds due to the fact that: ‖Rx‖∞ ≤ |||R|||∞ · ‖x‖∞ for any matrix R
and vector x. Let Y = ‖X‖∞ = max (|X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xr|). Similar to part (i) of the proof, each
|Xi|, 1 ≤ i ≤ r follows the exponential distribution with rate ǫ. According to the memoryless
property of the exponential distribution, we create a chain of variables, as follows:
Y = max (|X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xr|) = Xλ=rǫ +Xλ=(r−1)ǫ + · · ·+Xλ=ǫ (11)
where each Xλ=x denotes an independent exponential random variable with rate x. Intuitively,
Xλ=rǫ models the distribution of the smallest value among |X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xr|; Xλ=(r−i+1)ǫ, 1 <
i ≤ r models the difference between the i-th smallest value and the (i− 1)-th smallest value among
|X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xr|. The sum thus yields the maximum value among |X1|, |X2|, · · · , |Xr|.
Similar to the part (i) of the proof, we further derive:
E[etY ] = E[et(Xλ=rǫ+Xλ=(r−1)ǫ+···+Xλ=ǫ)] = E[et(Xλ=rǫ)] · E[et(Xλ=(r−1)ǫ)] · · · · ·E[et(Xλ=ǫ)]
Because E[etXλ=a ] =
∫∞
0 e
tx · ae−axdx = aa−t for any t < a, we reach:
∀t < ǫ,E[etY ] =
r∏
i=1
iǫ
iǫ− t
.
Finally, according to Lemma 4.6, we have the following inequality:
Pr(Y > c) = Pr(et·Y > etc)
≤ E[e
t(Y )]
ect
=
r∏
i=1
iǫ
iǫ− t/e
ct
With the choice of t = ǫ2 and c =
ξ
|||B|||∞ , we obtain:
‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ ≤ |||B|||∞ · ‖X‖∞
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ > ξ) ≤ Pr(‖X‖∞ > ξ|||B|||∞ )
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖MP (Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ > ξ) ≤
(∏r
i=1
iǫ
iǫ−t
)
/ect =
(∏r
i=1
iǫ
iǫ−ǫ/2
)
/e
ξǫ
2|||B|||∞
When ǫ ≥
(
2|||B|||∞
(∑r
i=1 ln(
i
i−0.5 )− ln η
))
/ξ, the above probability is bounded by η.
4.3. Relaxed Workload Decomposition
Program 9 is rather difficult to solve, since it contains a non-linear objective and complex con-
straints. To devise a stable numerical solution, we relax the formulation so that BL does not neces-
sarily match W exactly, but within a small error tolerance. To do this, we introduce a new parameter
γ to bound the difference between W and BL in terms of the Frobenius norm. This leads to the
following optimization program:
min
B,L
1
2
tr(BTB)
s.t. ‖W −BL‖F ≤ γ
∀j
r∑
i
|Lij | ≤ 1
(12)
The following theorem analyzes the error of LRM with the optimal decomposition obtained by
solving Program (12).
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THEOREM 4.8. The expected squared error of MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) using the optimal decomposi-
tion (B,L) solved from Program (12) is at most
2tr(BTB)/ǫ2 + γ
∑
i
x2i
PROOF. When W 6= BL, there are two sources of error. The first is the added Laplace noise.
According to Lemma 4.2, the error incurred by the Laplace noise is at most 2ǫ2Φ(B)(∆(L))
2 ≤
2
ǫ2 tr(B
TB).
The second source of the error is due to the difference betweenW andBL. The incurred expected
squared error is bounded by:
((W −BL)D)T (W −BL)D
≤ ‖W −BL‖2FDTD = ‖W −BL‖2F
n∑
i=1
x2i
The inequality above is due to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality. By linearity of expectation, the
expected squared errors can be simply summed up. This leads to the conclusion of the theorem.
While Theorem 4.8 implies the possibility of estimating the optimal γ, it is not practical to im-
plement it directly, because this estimation depends on the data, i.e.,
∑
i x
2
i . In our experiments, we
test different values of γ, report their relative performance, and describe guidelines for setting the
appropriate γ independently of the underlying data.
5. SOLVING FOR THE OPTIMAL WORKLOAD DECOMPOSITION
This section solves the relaxed workload decomposition problem defined in Program (12). This
program is rather difficult to solve, because it is neither convex nor differntiable. In the following,
Section 5.1 describes an effective and efficient solution, based on the inexact Augmented Lagrangian
method [Conn et al. 1997; Lin et al. 2010]. Section 5.2 proves that the proposed solution always
converges, and analyzes its convergence rate.
5.1. Solution Based on Augmented Lagrangian Method
Observe that Program (12) is a constrained optimization problem with a large number of unknowns,
a non-linear objective and rather complex constraints. Since there is no known analytic solution to
such a problem, we focus on numerical solutions. Furthermore, Program (12) is difficult to tackle
even with numerical methods, due to three main challenges. First and foremost, there are a a set of
non-differentiable constraints ∀j∑ri |Lij | ≤ 1, which rules out many generic techniques for solv-
ing constrained optimization problems, such as the Lagrange multiplier method, which are limited
to problems with differentiable constraints. Second, the non-differentiable constraints involve the
unknown matrix L, whereas the objective function involves another unknown matrix B, whose re-
lationship to L is rather complex (i.e., in constraint ‖W−BL‖F ≤ γ); consequently, it is non-trivial
to apply specialized methods for handling the non-differentiable constraints. Finally, Program (12)
is not convex with respect to the unknowns B and L.
The main idea of the proposed solution is to break down Program (12) into simpler, solvable sub-
problems. Since the most difficult part of Program (12) is the existence of the non-differentiable con-
straints ∀j∑ri |Lij | ≤ 1, we aim to break down the whole problem into subproblems with only these
constraints, and an objective function that only involves the unknownL, not B. Then, we use a spe-
cialized technique to solve each of these subproblems. Specifically, we first eliminate the constraint
‖W −BL‖F ≤ γ → 0 using the augmented Lagrangian method, which runs in multiple iterations,
each of which solves a subproblem with only the constraints ∀j∑ri |Lij | ≤ 1. Then, inside each it-
eration, we removeB from the objective function of the subproblem, by alternatively optimizing for
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ALGORITHM 1: Workload Matrix Decomposition
1: Initialize π(0) = 0 ∈ Rm×n, β(0) = 1, k = 1
2: while not converged do
3: while not converged do
4: B(k) ← update B using Equation (14)
5: L(k) ← run Algorithm 3 to update L according to Program (15)
6: Compute τ = ‖W −B(k)L(k)‖F
7: if τ is sufficiently small or β is sufficiently large then
8: return B(k) and L(k)
9: if k is a multiple of 10 then
10: β(k+1) = 2β(k)
11: π(k+1) = π(k) + β(k+1)
(
W −B(k)L(k)
)
12: k = k + 1
B and L. The result are subproblems with only the constraints ∀j∑ri |Lij | ≤ 1 as well as an objec-
tive function that has only L as unknowns. Each of these subproblems are then solved by applying
a special solver called Nesterov’s first order optimal gradient method [Nesterov 2003]. An impor-
tant optimization is that we apply the inexact augmented Lagrangian method [Conn et al. 1997;
Lin et al. 2010], which does not solve the subproblem exactly in each iteration exactly, leading both
increased efficiency and stability.
Algorithm 1 shows the proposed solution for Program (12). First, we apply the inexact augmented
Lagrangian method to eliminate the linear constraint ‖W −BL‖F ≤ γ → 0, as follows: we add to
the objective function (i) a positive penalty item β ∈ R and (ii) the Lagrange multiplier π ∈ Rm×n.
β and π are iteratively updated, following the strategy in [Conn et al. 1997; Lin et al. 2010]. In each
iteration, the values of β and π are fixed, and the algorithm aims to find values for B and L that
minimize the following subproblem:
min
B,L
J (B,L, β, π) = 1
2
tr(BTB) + 〈π,W −BL〉+ β
2
‖W −BL‖2F (13)
s.t. ∀j
∑
i
|Lij | ≤ 1
Next we eliminate unknowns B from the objective function of the above subproblem, Program
. Observe that this is a bi-convex optimization problem with respect to B and L, meaning that it is
convex with respect to B (resp. L), once we fix L (resp. B) to a constant. Hence, we solve it by
alternately optimizing B and L (lines 3-5 of Algorithm 1). Note that following the inexact Aug-
mented Lagrangian Multiplier methodology, it is not necessary to obtain the exact optimal values of
B and L, instead, a small number of iterations of the while-loop in lines 4-5 suffices. We first focus
on optimizing B, treating L as constant. Observe that J (·) is convex with respect to B. Hence, the
optimal B can be obtained by solving ∂J∂B = 0. In particular, the gradient with respect to B is:
∂J
∂B
= B − πLT + βBLLT − βWLT
Solving B from ∂J∂B = 0, we obtain:
B =
(
βWLT + πLT
) (
βLLT + I
)−1 (14)
Next we show how to optimize L with a fixed B. This is equivalent to the following quadratic
program:
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G(L) = β
2
tr
(
LTBTBL
)− tr((βW + π)T BL)
s.t. ∀j
∑
i
|Lij | ≤ 1
(15)
The gradient of the objective G(L) respect to L in (15) can be computed as:
∂G
∂L
= βBTBL− βBTW −BTπ (16)
For all L′, L′′ with ∀j∑i |L′ij | ≤ 1, ∀j∑i |L′′ij | ≤ 1, we have the following inequalities:
‖G(L′)− G(L′′)‖F
‖L′ − L′′‖F =
‖βBTBL′ − βBTBL′′‖F
‖L′ − L′′‖F
≤ |||βB
TB|||2 · ‖L′ − L′′‖F
‖L′ − L′′‖F = β · |||B
TB|||2
Therefore, the gradient of G(L) is Lipschitz continuous with parameter ω = β · |||BTB|||2.
We employ Nesterov’s first order optimal gradient method [Nesterov 2003] to solve the program
in (15). Nesterov’s method has a much faster convergence rate than traditional methods such as the
subgradient method or naive projected gradient descent. The updating rule in the projected gradient
method is expressed as follows:
L(t+1) = P(L(t) − η(t) ∂G
∂L(t)
)
where t denotes the iteration counter, P(L) denotes the L1 projection operator on any L ∈ Rr×n,
η > 0 denotes the appropriate step size. One typical choice for η is the inverse of the gradient lips-
chitz constant 1/ω, however, this can be sub-optimal when the gradient lipschitz constant is large.
One can incooperate Beck et al.’s backtracking line search strategy to further accelerate the con-
vergence of the projected gradient algorithm [Beck and Teboulle 2009]. We adopt this line search
strategy in our algorithm.
L is updated by gradient descent while ensuring that the L1 regularized constraint on L is satis-
fied. This is done by the L1 projection operator, formulated as the following optimization problem:
P(L) = arg min
L¯∈Rr×n
‖L¯− L‖2F , s.t. ∀j
∑
i
|L¯ij | ≤ 1, (17)
We observe that Equation (17) can be decoupled into n independent L1 regularized sub-problems:
arg min
l¯∈Rr×1
‖l¯− l‖22, s.t.
∑
i
|l¯i| ≤ 1
where l = L(t)j , j = 1, 2, · · · , n, L(t)j is the jth column of L(t). Such a projection operator can be
solved efficiently by L1 projection methods in O(r log r) time [Duchi et al. 2008], as described in
Algorithm 2. The complete algorithm for solving Program (15) is summarized in Algorithm 3.
5.2. Convergence Analysis
This subsection analyzes the convergence properties of the proposed workload decomposition algo-
rithm. In each iteration, Algorithm 1 solves a sequence of Lagrangian subproblems by optimizing
B (step 4) and L (step 5) alternatingly. The algorithm stops when a sufficiently small γ is obtained
or the penalty parameter β is sufficiently large. It suffices to guarantee that L converges to a locally
optimal solution [Lin et al. 2010; Wen et al. 2012a; Wen et al. 2012b].
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ALGORITHM 2: Algorithm for L1 Ball Projection
1: input: A vector l ∈ Rr×1
2: sort l into v such that v1 ≥ v2 ≥ · · · ≥ vr
3: find ρ = max{i ∈ [r] : vi − 1i
(∑i
k=1 vk − 1
)
> 0}
4: compute θ = 1
ρ
(∑ρ
i=1 vi − 1
)
5: output l¯ ∈ Rr×1, s.t. l¯i = max(li − θ, 0), i ∈ [r]
ALGORITHM 3: Nesterov’s Projected Gradient Method
1: input: G(L), ∂G
∂L
, L(0)
2: χ = r · n · 10−12, Lipschitz parameter: ω(0) = 1
3: Initializations: L(1) = L(0), τ (−1) = 0, τ (0) = 1, t = 1
4: while not converged do
5: α = τ
(t−2)
−1
τ(t−1)
, S = L(t) + α(L(t) − L(t−1))
6: for j = 0 to · · · do
7: ω = 2jω(t−1), U = S − 1
ω
∇S
8: Project U to the feasible set to obtain L(t) (i.e., solve Equation (17))
9: if ‖S − L(t)‖F < χ then
10: return;
11: Define function: Jω,S(U) = G(S) + 〈 ∂G∂U , U − S〉+ ω2 ‖U − S‖2F
12: if G(L(t)) ≤ Jω,S(U) then
13: ω(t) = ω;L(t+1) = L(t); break;
14: Set τ (t) = 1+
√
1+4(τ(t−1))2
2
15: t = t+ 1
16: return L(t)
In general, penalty methods have the property that when the global (or local) minimizers of the
subproblem are found, every limit point is a global (or local) minimizer of the original problem
[Fiacco and McCormick 1968]. This property is preserved by the Augmented Lagrangian Multi-
plier counterparts. Therefore, the proposed solution for the workload decomposition problem con-
verges, whenever the bi-convex optimization subproblem in Program (5.1) converges. Regarding
the convergence properties of the bi-convex optimization subproblem, past study [Bertsekas 1999]
on bi-convex optimization has shown that block coordinate descent is guaranteed to converge to
the stationary point for strictly convex problems. However, the subproblem in Program (5.1) is not
strictly convex (though it is convex); meanwhile, the subproblem may have multiple optimal so-
lutions, which may cause problems to its convergence. Fortunately, for bi-convex optimizations
which only involves two blocks, [Grippo and Sciandrone 2000] shows that the strict convexity of
the subproblem is not required; every limit point of {B(k), L(k)} is a stationary point. Accordingly,
the bi-convex optimization subproblem exhibits nice convergence properties. In the following, we
formalize and prove the convergence results of the proposed algorithm.
We first present the first order KKT conditions of the optimization problem in Program (12).
Introducing Lagrange multipliers µ ∈ Rn×1 and π ∈ Rm×n for the inequality constraints
∀j∑ri |Lij | ≤ 1 and linear constraints W = BL respectively, we derive the following KKT condi-
tions of the optimization problem:
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µ ≥ 0 (Non-Negativity)
W = BL, ∀j
r∑
i
|Lij | ≤ 1 (Feasibility)
B = πLT , 0 ∈
n∑
j
µj
∂
∑r
i |Lij |
∂L
−BTπ (Optimality)
∀j µj(
r∑
i
|Lij | − 1) = 0 (Complementary Slackness)
(18)
The following theorem establishes the convergence properties of the proposed algorithm, under
the assumption that the iterates generated by Algorithm 1 exhibit no jumping behavior. Remark that
the similar condition was used in [Wen et al. 2012a; Wen et al. 2012b].
THEOREM 5.1. Convergence of Algorithm 1. Let X , (B,L, π) and {X(k)}∞k=1 be the in-
termediate results of Algorithm 1 after the k-th iteration. Assume that {X(k)}∞k=1 is bounded and
limk→∞(X(k+1) −X(k)) = 0. Then any accumulation point of {X(k)}∞k=1 satisfies the KKT con-
ditions presented in Equation (18). In other words, whenever {X(k)}∞k=1 converges, it converges to
a first-order KKT optimal point.
PROOF. Since L(k+1) is the global optimal solution of Program (15), by the KKT optimal con-
dition, there exist µ ≥ 0, µ ∈ Rn×1 and L(k+1) such that the following equation holds:
0 ∈ ∂G
∂L(k+1)
+
n∑
j
µj
∂
∑r
i |L(k+1)ij |
∂L(k+1)
(19)
Note that G is a convex function with respect to L(k+1). Hence, the KKT conditions are both neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for global optimality. Combining Equations (16) and (19), we obtain:
βB(k+1)T
(
B(k+1)T (L(k+1) − L(k))
)
(20)
= βB(k+1)T (W −B(k+1)TL(k)) +B(k+1)Tπ −
n∑
j
µj
∂
∑r
i |L(k+1)ij |
∂L(k+1)
We derive the following equations according to the update rule for B (at Line 4 in Algorithm 1) and
the Lagrangian multiplier update rule for π (at Line 11 in Algorithm 1), respectively:
B(k+1) −B(k) =
(
βWL(k)T + πL(k)T −B(k)(βL(k)L(k)T + I)
)(
βL(k)L(k)T + I
)−1
(21)
π(k+1) − π(k) = −β(k+1)
(
W −B(k+1)L(k+1)
)
(22)
Since {X(k)}∞k=1 is bounded according to our assumption, the sequences {B(k)}∞k=1 and {L(k)}∞k=1
are also bounded. Hence, limk→∞(X(k+1) − X(k)) = 0 implies that both sides of Equation (20,
21, 22) converge to zero as k approaches infinity. Consequently,
W −B(k)L(k) → 0, πL(k)T −B(k) → 0
∃µ : −B(k+1)Tπ +
n∑
j
µj
∂
∑r
i |L(k+1)ij |
∂L(k+1)
→ 0 (23)
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where the first limit in Equation (23) is used to derive other limits. Therefore, the sequence
{X(k)}∞k=1 asymptotically satisfies the KKT conditions in Equation (18). This completes the
proof.
Next we focus on the convergence rate of the proposed algorithm. The following theorem states
that it converges linearly.
THEOREM 5.2. Convergence Rate of Algorithm 1. Let X , (B,L, π) and {X(k)}∞k=1 be the
intermediate results of Algorithm 1 after the k-th iteration. Assume that {X(k)}∞k=1 is bounded and
limk→∞(X(k+1) − X(k)) = 0. Let (B(k), L(k)) be the solution obtained after the k-th iteration
and (B∗, L∗) be the optimal solution to Program (12), we have
min
i=1,2,...,k
|tr
(
B(i)
T
B(i)
)
− tr
(
B∗TB∗
)
| ≤ O
(
1
k
)
(24)
In other words, Algorithm 1 converges to the stationary point linearly.
PROOF. Let B(k) denote the solution of the Lagrangian sub-problem in the kth iteration. The
following inequality holds on the sequence of the Lagrangian subproblems:
J (B(k+1), L(k+1), π(k), β(k))
≤ min
W=BL,
∀j
∑
i |Lij |≤1
J (B,L, π(k), β(k))
≤ min
W=BL,
∀j
∑
i |Lij |≤1
J (B,L, π∗, β(k))
= min
W=BL,
∀j
∑
i |Lij |≤1
1
2
tr(BTB) =
1
2
tr(B∗TB∗) (25)
By the definition of J (·) and the inequality above, we derive the following inequality:
1
2
tr(B(k+1)
T
B(k+1))
= J (B(k+1), L(k+1), π(k), β(k))− 〈π(k),W −B(k+1)L(k+1)〉+ β
(k)
2
‖W −B(k+1)L(k+1)‖2F
= J (B(k+1), L(k+1), π(k), β(k))− 1
2β(k)
(
‖π(k) + β(k)(W −B(k+1)L(k+1))‖2F − ‖π(k)‖2F
)
= J (B(k+1), L(k+1), π(k), β(k))− 1
2β(k)
(
‖π(k+1)‖2F − ‖π(k)‖2F
)
≤ 1
2
tr(B∗TB∗)− 1
2β(k)
(
‖π(k+1)‖2F − ‖π(k)‖2F
)
(26)
The third equality holds because of the Lagrangian multiplier update rule:
W −B(k+1)L(k+1) = 1
β(k)
(
π(k+1) − π(k)
)
.
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By the non-negativity of norms, we have:
1
2
tr(B(k+1)
T
B(k+1)) ≥ 1
2
tr(B(k+1)
T
B(k+1))− ‖W −B(k+1)L(k+1)‖2F
≥ 1
2
tr(B∗TB
∗
)− ‖W −B(k+1)L(k+1)‖2F
=
1
2
tr(B∗TB
∗
)− 1
2β(k)
(
‖π(k+1)‖2F − ‖π(k)‖2F
)
(27)
Combining Equations (26) and (27), we obtain:
β(i+1)
(
tr
(
B(i+1)
T
B(i+1)
)
− tr
(
B∗TB∗
))
= ‖π(i+1)‖2F − ‖π(i)‖2F , ∀i
Summing this equality above over i = 0, 1..., k − 1, we have:
k−1∑
i=0
β(i+1)
(
tr
(
B(i+1)
T
B(i+1)
)
− tr
(
B∗TB∗
))
= ‖π(k)‖2F − ‖π(0)‖2F (28)
Since β(k) is non-decreasing, we have:
min
i=0,1,...,k−1
|tr
(
B(i+1)
T
B(i+1)
)
− tr
(
B∗TB∗
)
| ≤
(‖π(k)‖2F − ‖π(0)‖2F ) /β(0)
k
(29)
By the boundedness of ‖π(k)‖2F − ‖π(0)‖2F , we complete the proof.
Note that although our convergence proof assumes that each subproblem is solved exactly, this
is not required in practise, because the inexact augmented Lagrange multipliers method has been
shown to converge practically as fast as the exact augmented Lagrange multipliers [Lin et al. 2010].
Meanwhile, inexact augmented Lagrange multipliers require significantly fewer iterations when
solving the subproblem, leading to much higher efficiency.
Complexity Analysis: Each update onB in Equation (14) takesO(r2m) time, while each update
on L consumesO(r2n) time. Assuming that Algorithm 1 converges to a local minimum within Nin
inner iterations (at line 3 in Algorithm 1) and Nout outer iterations (line 2 in Algorithm 1), the
overall complexity of Algorithm 1 is O(Nin ×Nout × (r2m+ r2n)).
6. LRM UNDER (ǫ, δ)-DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
This section extends LRM to (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Section 6.1 formulates the workload decom-
position as an optimization program. Section 6.2 analyzes the utility of LRM. Section 6.3 discusses
the algorithm for solving optimal workload decomposition.
6.1. Workload Decomposition
Similar to the case of ǫ-differential privacy described in section 4, LRM decomposes the workload
matrix W into W = BL. Then, LRM applies the Gaussian mechanism to the intermediate queries
corresponding to L to enforce (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Finally, LRM combines the noisy results
of the intermediate queries according to B, to obtain the results of Q. Formally, let Θ(L) be the L2
sensitivity of L, i.e., Θ(L) = maxj
(∑
i L
2
ij
)1/2
. LRM under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy is defined
as follows.
MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) = B
(
LD +Gau
(
Θ(L)
h(ǫ, δ)
)r)
(30)
where h(ǫ, δ) = ǫ√
8 ln(2/δ)
.
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
A:24 G. Yuan et al.
Let Φ(B) be scale of the decomposition as defined in Definition 4.1, i.e., Φ(B) =
∑
i,j B
2
ij . The
following lemma shows that the error of LRM is linear to Φ(B), and quadratic to Θ(L).
LEMMA 6.1. The expected squared error of MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) with respect to the decomposi-
tion W = BL is 8 ln(2/δ)ΦBΘ(L)2/ǫ2.
PROOF. According to Equation (30), Q(D) −MLRM(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) = B
(
Gau
(
Θ(L)
h(ǫ,δ)
)r)
. The
expected squared error of LRM is thus
∑
ij B
2
ij
2(Θ(L))2
h(ǫ,δ)2
. Since ΦB =
∑
ij B
2
ij and h(ǫ, δ) =
ǫ√
8 ln(2/δ)
, the error can be rewritten as 8 ln(2/δ)ΦBΘ(L)2/ǫ2.
Therefore, the best decomposition is the one that minimizes ΦBΘ(L)2. Similar to the case of ǫ-
differential privacy, the particular value of Θ(L) is not important, as stated in the following lemma.
LEMMA 6.2. Given a workload decomposition W = BL, we can always construct another
decomposition W = B′L′ satisfying (i) Θ(L′) = 1 and (ii) (B′, L′) lead to the same expected
squared error of MLRM,(ǫ,δ) as (B, L).
The proof is similar to that of Lemma 4.3, and omitted for brevity. Based on Lemma 6.2, we
formulate the following optimization program for finding the best decomposition for MLRM,(ǫ,δ):
min
B,L
1
2
tr(BTB)
s.t. W = BL
∀j
r∑
i
L2ij ≤ 1
(31)
6.2. Utility Analysis and Budget Selection
This subsection analyzes the utility MLRM,(ǫ,δ), as well as the choice of the privacy parameters (ǫ,
δ) given a user-specified utility constraint. We use (ξ, η)-usefulness (Definition 4.5) as the utility
measure. The result is stated in the following theorem.
THEOREM 6.3. Utility of LRM under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Given database D and work-
load W , for any ξ > 0 and 0 < η < 1, mechanism MLRM,(ǫ,δ) using the optimal decom-
position W = BL solved from Program (31) has the following utility guarantees: (i) when
ǫ ≥
√
6 · ln 2δ ·
(
r
2 ln 3− ln η
)|||B|||2/ξ, the output of MLRM,(ǫ,δ) is (ξ, η)-useful under the ‖ · ‖2-
norm; (ii) when ǫ ≥
√
(6 ln r − 3 ln 3)(ln 2− ln δ)/η|||B|||∞/ξ, the output of MLRM,(ǫ,δ) is
(ξ, η)-useful under the ‖ · ‖∞-norm.
PROOF. (i) Let X be the Gaussian noise vector injected to the intermediate results in LRM.
According to Equation (30), we have:
‖MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D)−Q(D)‖22 = ‖B(LD +X)−WD‖22 = ‖B ·X‖22 ≤ |||B|||22 · ‖X‖22
The inequality above is due to the fact that ‖Rx‖2 ≤ |||R|||2 · ‖x‖2, for any matrix R and vector x.
Accordingly, we derive the following:
‖MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D)−Q(D)‖22 ≤ |||B|||22 · ‖X‖22
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D)−Q(D)‖22 ≥ ξ2) ≤ Pr(‖X‖22 · |||B|||22 ≥ ξ2)
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D)−Q(D)‖2 ≥ ξ) ≤ Pr(‖X‖22 ≥ ξ
2
|||B|||22 )
ACM Transactions on Database Systems, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Optimizing Batch Linear Queries under Exact and Approximate Differential Privacy A:25
Next we focus on properties of X . According to the Gaussian mechanism, the elements of X ,
i.e., X1, X2, · · · , Xr follow i.i.d. zero-mean Gaussian distribution with scale σ = Θ(L)h(ǫ,δ) . Since the
decomposition W = BL is solved from Program 31, we have Θ(L) = 1. Thus, σ = 1h(ǫ,δ) =√
2 ln(2/δ)
ǫ .
Let t, c be any positive number, we have:
Pr(‖X‖22 ≥ c) = Pr
(‖X‖22
tσ2
>
c
tσ2
)
= Pr
(
e
‖X‖22
tσ2 > e
c
tσ2
)
≤
E
[
e
‖X‖22
tσ2
]
e
c
tσ2
where the last inequality holds due to Markov’s inequality.
Consider the random variable Yi = exp
(
X2i
tσ2
)
, where t is an arbitrary positive number such that
E[Yi] exists. According to the probability density function of the Gaussian distribution (Equation
(7)), we have:
E[Yi] =
∫ ∞
−∞
g(x)e
(
x2
tσ2
)
dx =
∫ ∞
−∞
√
1
2πσ2
e
(
− x2
2σ2
)
e
x2
tσ2 dx =
√
t
t− 2 , ∀t > 2
Based on the above derivations, and the fact that Xi’s are independent variables, we obtain:
Pr(‖X‖22 ≥ c) ≤
∏r
i=1(Ee
X2i
tσ2 )
e
c
tσ2
=
∏r
i=1 E[Yi]
e
c
tσ2
=
( tt−2 )
r/2
e
c
tσ2
With the choice of t = 3, c = ξ
2
|||B|||22 , and σ =
√
2 ln(2/δ)
ǫ , this leads to:
Pr(‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖2 ≥ ξ) ≤
( tt−2 )
r/2
e
c
tσ2
=
3r/2
e
ξ2ǫ2
6 ln(2/δ)|||B|||2
2
When ǫ ≥
√
6 · ln 2δ ·
(
r
2 ln 3− ln η
)|||B|||2/ξ, the above probability is bound by η.
(ii) Let X be the Gaussian noise vector injected to the intermediate results as in part (i) of the
proof. We have:
‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖2∞ = ‖B ·X‖2∞ ≤ |||B|||2∞ · ‖X‖2∞ = |||σB|||2∞ · ‖
1
σ
X‖2∞
The above inequality holds due to the fact that ‖Rx‖∞ ≤ |||R|||∞ · ‖x‖∞ for any matrix R and
vector x. Let Z = ‖ 1σX‖2∞ =
(
max( 1σX1, · · ·max( 1σXr)
)2
. We derive:
‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖2∞ ≤ |||σB|||2∞ · ‖ 1σX‖2∞
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖2∞ ≥ ξ2) ≤ Pr(|||σB|||2∞ · Z ≥ ξ2)
⇒ ∀ξ,Pr(‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ ≥ ξ) ≤ Pr(Z ≥ ξ
2
|||σB|||2∞ )
By Markov’s inequality, we obtain:
Pr(Z ≥ ξ
2
|||σB|||2∞
) ≤ E[Z]
ξ2
|||σB|||2∞
Note that the above bound is tight, even though Chernoff bound can not be applied here.
Next we derive an upper bound for the expected value ofZ . Let Y = 1σX . Clearly, Y1, Y2, · · · , Yr
are independent, standard normal random variables. Hence, Y 2i ’s (1 ≤ i ≤ r) are i.i.d. χ21 variables,
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i.e., Chi-square random variables with 1-degree of freedom. The probability density function fi for
Yi is thus:
fi(x) =
1√
2π
x−
1
2 e−
x
2
Since the function exp(·) is convex and positive, by Jensen’s inequality, for any t such that E[etZ ]
exists, we have:
etE[Z] ≤ E[etZ ] = E[max
i
etY
2
i ] ≤
r∑
i=1
E[etY
2
i ] (32)
Meanwhile, for any t < 12 , we have E[e
tY 2i ] =
∫ +∞
0
etx 1√
2π
x−
1
2 e−
x
2 dx = (1 − 2t)− 12 . Combine
this with Equation (32), we obtain an upper bound of the expected value of Z:
E[Z] ≤ ln r
t
− 1
2t
ln(1− 2t)
With the choice of t = 13 , we haveE[Z] ≤ 3 ln r+ 32 ln 3. Since ∀j
∑
i L
2
ij ≤ 1, the sensitivity over
the batch query workload Q is 1. Since σ =
√
2 ln(2/δ)
ǫ , we obtain the following:
∀ξ,Pr(‖Mǫ,δ(Q,D)−Q(D)‖∞ ≥ ξ) ≤ E[Z] · |||σB|||2∞/ξ2
≤
(
3 ln r +
3
2
ln 3
)
· |||σB|||2∞/ξ2
=
(
3 ln r +
3
2
ln 3
)
· (2 ln(2/δ)) · |||B|||2∞/(ξǫ)2
When ǫ ≥
√
(6 ln r − 3 ln 3)(ln 2− ln δ)/η|||B|||∞/ξ, the above probability is bound by η.
6.3. Solving for the Optimal Workload Decomposition
The optimization program (i.e., Program (31)) for workload decomposition under (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy is identical to the one under ǫ-differential privacy (Program (9)), except that the former uses
L2 sensitivity in the constraints ∀j
∑r
i L
2
ij ≤ 1 whereas the latter uses L1 sensitivity. Hence, to
solve Program (31), we simply adapt Algorithm 1 by modifying the parts related to these constraints.
The only major modification of Algorithm 1 lies in the projection step, which now needs to
projects every column in L onto the L2 ball of radius 1, instead of the L1 unit ball as in Section 5.
Specifically, the L2 ball projection is performed by solving the following optimization program:
min
L¯∈Rr×n
‖L¯− L‖2F , s.t. ∀j
∑
i
L¯2ij ≤ 1 (33)
The above program can be decoupled into n independentL2 regularized sub-problems:
arg min
l¯∈Rr×1
‖l¯− l‖22, s.t.
∑
i
l¯2i ≤ 1
where l = L(t)j , j = 1, 2, ..., n, L
(t)
j is the jth column of L(t). Such a projection can be computed
by l¯ = lmax(1,‖l‖2) . Therefore, the projection can be computed efficiently in linear time. Finally, by
adapting the proofs in section 5.2, we can draw the conclusion that the modified Algorithm 1 for
optimizing workload decomposition for LRM under under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy also converges
to the a local KKT optimal point linearly. We omit the complete proofs for brevity.
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7. EXPERIMENTS
This section experimentally evaluate the effectiveness of LRM under ǫ- and (ǫ, δ)- differential pri-
vacy definitions. For ǫ-differential privacy, we compares LRM against six state-of-the-art meth-
ods: Laplace mechanism (LM) [Dwork et al. 2006c], Privlet (WM) [Xiao et al. 2010], hierarchical
mechanism (HM) [Hay et al. 2010], exponential smoothing (ESM) [Yuan et al. 2012] (an imple-
mentation of the approximate matrix mechanism [Li et al. 2010], described in Appendix A.1), adap-
tive mechanism (AM) [Li and Miklau 2012] (another implementation of the approximate matrix
mechanism [Li et al. 2010; Li and Miklau 2012], described in Appendix A.2) and the exponential
mechanism with multiplicative weights update (MWEM) [Hardt et al. 2012], whose performance
depends on the dataset. For (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we compare LRM against WM, HM, ESM,
AM, and the Gaussian mechanism (GM) [McSherry and Mironov 2009].
Implementations: For AM, we employ the Python implementation that can be obtained from
the authors’ website (http://cs.umass.edu/
˜
chaoli). We use the default stopping cri-
terion provided by the authors. For MWEM, we used Hardt et al’s C# code listed in the Ap-
pendix of [Hardt et al. 2012]). Note that MWEM needs to tune an additional parameter T which
denotes the number of iterations in order to ensure its performance. We follow the experimen-
tal setting in [Hardt et al. 2012]. Specifically, we choose T ∈ {10, 12, 14, 16} in our experi-
ments and reported the values for the best setting of T in each case (Strictly speaking, such pa-
rameter tuning violates differential privacy; hence, the reported results are in favor on MWEM).
For all remaining methods, we implemented them in Matlab, and published all code online
(http://yuanganzhao.weebly.com/). We performed all experiments on a desktop PC with
an Intel quad-core 2.50 GHz CPU and 4GBytes RAM. In each experiment, every algorithm is exe-
cuted 20 times and the average performance is reported.
Datasets: We use four real-world data sets in our experiments [Hay et al. 2010; Xu et al. 2013;
Hardt et al. 2012]: Search Log, Net Trace, Social Network and UCI Adult. Search Log includes
search keyword statistics collected from Google Trends and American Online between 2004 and
2010. Each unit count is the number of appearances of a particular keyword. Social Network con-
tains information about users in a social network, where each unit count is the number of users with
a specific degree in the social graph. Net Trace is collected from a university intranet, where each
unit count is the number of TCP packets related to a particular IP address. The total number of
unit counts in Search Logs, Net Trace and Social Network are 65, 536, 32, 768 and 11, 342 respec-
tively. The UCI Adult data was extracted from the census bureau database in the U.S. Department
of Commerce, it contains 14 features, among which six are continuous and eight are categorical.
We use the following strategies to generate the sensitive data with varying domain size n. For the
{Search Log, Net Trace, Social Network} data sets, we transform the original counts into a vector
of fixed size n (domain size), by merging consecutive counts in order. For the UCI Adult data set,
we only consider the combined {workclass, education, occupation, race} attributes (with their total
corresponding domain of size {8 × 16 × 14 × 5 = 8960}) and uniformly choose n domains. The
counting numbers of their corresponding records are used as the domain data. We observed that all
the data sets {Search Log, Net Trace, Social Network} are dense with their sparsity exactly equals
to 100%, while the UCI Adult data set is sparse with its sparsity roughly 12% ∼ 17%.
Workloads: We generated four different types of workloads, namely WDiscrete, WRange,
WMarginal and WRelated. In WDiscrete, for each Wij (i.e., the coefficient of the i-th query on
the j-th unit count), we set Wij = 1 with probability 0.02 and Wij = −1 otherwise. In WRange,
each query qi sums the unit counts in a range [si, ti] ⊂ [1, n], i.e., Wij = 1 for si ≤ j ≤ ti, and
Wij = 0 otherwise. The start and end points si and ti of each query qi is randomly generated, fol-
lowing the uniform distribution. WMarginal is used in [Li and Miklau 2012], which contain queries
that are uniformly sampled from the set of all 2-way marginals. For WRelated, we generate s inde-
pendent linear counting queries (called base queries) with random weights following (0, 1)-normal
distribution. Let A (of size s × n) denote the workload matrix of the s queries. We also generate
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another matrix C of size m × s in a similar way The workload matrix W is then the product of C
and A, i.e., the linear combination of base queries according to C.
Parameters: We test the impact of five parameters in our experiments: γ, r, n, m and s. γ is
the relaxation factor defined in Program (12). r is the number of intermediate queries in LRM, i.e.,
the number of columns in B (and also the number of rows in L). n is the number of unit counts
and m is the number of queries in the batch. Finally, s is the number of base queries during the
generation of WRelated. The ranges and defaults (shown in bold) of the parameters are summarized
in Table II. Moreover, we test three different values of the privacy budget: ǫ = 1, 0.1 and 0.01. For
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, following [Li and Miklau 2012], we set δ = 0.0001.
Table II. Parameters used in the experiments.
γ 0.0001, 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10
r {0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.7, 2.1, 2.5, 3.0, 3.6} × rank(W )
n 128, 256, 512, 1024, 2048, 4096, 8192
m 64, 128, 256, 512, 1024
s (during the generation of WRelated ) {0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0} ×min(m, n)
In the experiments, we measure average squared error and computation time of the methods.
Specifically, the average squared error is the average squared L2 distance between the exact query
answers and the noisy answers. In the following, Section 7.1 examines the impact of γ and r, which
are only used in LRM. The results provide important insights on how to set these two parameters to
maximize the utility of LRM. Then, Sections 7.2 to 7.5 compare LRM against existing methods.
7.1. Impact of γ and r on LRM
In LRM, the relaxation factor γ controls the difference between BL and W . In our first set of
experiments, we investigate the impact of γ on the accuracy and efficiency of LRM. Figure 2 and
Figure 3 report the performance of LRM with varying values for γ under ǫ-differential privacy and
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy respectively, using the Search Logs dataset. Results on other datasets lead
to similar conclusions, and are omitted for brevity.
The results in the Figure 2 and Figure 3 show that when ǫ is relatively low (meaning strong pri-
vacy), the error of LRM is not sensitive to γ regardless of the workload, for all values of γ tested in
the experiments ((10−4 to 10). Only when ǫ reaches 1 does large values of γ (e.g., γ > 1) show neg-
ative impact on the performance of LRM. This negative effect is relatively small under ǫ-differential
privacy; it is more pronounced under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. The reason is that the error of LRM
comes from two sources: the added noise and the difference between the decomposition BL and
the original workload W . When the privacy requirement is strong (i.e., when ǫ is relatively low,
or when ǫ-differential privacy is used), the error introduced by inexact decomposition is negligible
compared to the noise added to satisfy differential privacy. Conversely, with looser privacy require-
ment (high ǫ and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy definition), the noise level becomes low, and the error
in decomposition becomes more evident. Nevertheless, when γ ≤ 0.1, its impact is insignificant in
all settings. Meanwhile, LRM runs much faster with a larger γ. Overall, γ ≤ 0.1 is a safe choice,
and a larger value of γ is recommended for applications with strong privacy requirements. In the
following experiments, we fix γ to 0.01.
r is another important parameter in LRM that determines the rank of the matrix BL that ap-
proximates the workload W . r affects both the approximation accuracy and the optimization speed.
When r is too small, e.g., when r < rank(W ), our optimization formulation may fail to find a
good approximation, leading to suboptimal accuracy for the query batch. On the other hand, an
overly large r leads to poor efficiency, as the search space expands dramatically. We thus test LRM
with varying r, by controlling the ratio of r to the actual rank rank(W ), on the Search Log dataset.
We record the average squared error and running time of LRM for all the workloads under ǫ and (ǫ,
δ)-differential privacy, and report them in Figure 4 and Figure 5 respectively.
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Fig. 2. Effect of relaxation parameter γ on Search Logs under ǫ-differential privacy
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Fig. 3. Effect of relaxation parameter γ on Search Logs under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
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Fig. 4. Effect of r on Search Logs under ǫ-differential privacy
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Fig. 5. Effect of r on Search Logs under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
There are several important observations in Figure 4 and Figure 5. First, a value of r below
rank(W ) leads to far worse accuracy (up to two orders of magnitude) compared to settings with
higher values of r. Second, the performance of LRM becomes stable when r exceeds 1.2 ·rank(W )
for ǫ-differential privacy, and 1.0 · rank(W ) for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. This is because the opti-
mization formulation has enough freedom to find the optimal decomposition when r > rank(W ).
For (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, this result is expected, because any decomposition W = BL with
r > rank(W ) can be transformed into a decomposition B′L′ with r = rank(W ), by projecting
the columns of L and the rows of B onto the range of L, which does not affect the L2-sensitivity of
B. Finally, the amount of computations for workload decomposition increases linearly with r (note
that both axes are in logarithmic scale). Thus, to balance the efficiency and effectiveness of LRM,
a good value for r is between rank(W ) and 1.2 · rank(W ). In subsequent experiments, we set
r = 1.2 · rank(W ) and r = 1.0 · rank(W ) for ǫ and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Effect of domain size n on workload WDiscrete under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 7. Effect of domain size n on workload WRange under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 8. Effect of domain size n on workload WMarginal under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 9. Effect of domain size n on workload WRelated under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
7.2. Impact of Varying Domain Size n
We now evaluate the accuracy performance of all mechanisms with varying domain size n. We
perform all experiments with ǫ = 0.1, since the specific value of ǫ has negligible impact on the
relative performance of different mechanisms. For ǫ-differential privacy, we report the results of
all mechanisms on the 4 different workloads in Figures 6, 7, 8 and 9, respectively. On workloads
WMarginal and WRelated, the performance of AM and ESM is comparable to the naive Laplace
mechanism, and significantly worse than the other methods, sometimes by more than an order of
magnitude. This is mainly because the L2 approximation used by AM and ESM does not lead to a
good optimization of the actual objective function formulated using L1 sensitivity. On WDiscrete,
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Fig. 10. Effect of domain size n on workload WDiscrete under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
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Fig. 11. Effect of domain size n on workload WRange under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
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Fig. 12. Effect of domain size n on workload WMarginal under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
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Fig. 13. Effect of domain size n on workload WRelated under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
the Laplace mechanism outperforms all other mechanisms when the data is non-sparse and domain
size is relatively small. This is in part due to the fact that the queries in WDiscrete are generally
independent whenm ≥ n. Since the other mechanisms do not gain from correlations among queries,
Laplace mechanism is optimal in such a situation. Whereas all other data-independent mechanisms
incur an error linear to the domain size n, LRM’s error stops increasing when the domain size
reaches 512. This is because LRM’s error rate depends on the rank of the workload matrixW , which
is no larger than min(m,n). This explains the excellent performance of LRM in larger domains. On
WRange, the errors of WM and HM are smaller than that of the Laplace mechanism when the
domain size is no smaller than 512. Moreover, WM and HM perform better on WRange than on
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the others workloads, since they are designed to optimize mainly for range queries. Nonetheless,
LRM’s performance is significantly better than any of them, since it fully utilizes the correlations
between the range queries on large domains. On WMarginal and WRelated, LRM achieves the
best performance in all settings. The performance gap between LRM and other methods is over
two orders of magnitude when the domain size reaches 8192. Since WRelated naturally leads to a
low rank workload matrix W , this result verifies LRM’s vast benefit from exploiting the low-rank
property of the workload. Finally, we observe some interesting behaviors of the data-dependent
method MWEM. The error incurred by MWEM does not scale well with the domain size n on non-
sparse data sets. Moreover, MWEM performs comparably to LRM on Search Logs and Net Trace
when the n is very large (n ≥ 4096). However, the performance of MWEM is rather unstable; it
incurs much larger error than LRM on Social Network and UCI Adult, in some cases by more than
two order of magnitude.
Regarding (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we report the accuracy of all methods in Figures 10, 11,
12 and 13. LRM obtains the best performance in all settings, especially when n is large. Its im-
provement over the naive Gaussian mechanism is over two orders of magnitude. AM and ESM have
similar accuracy. For range queries, the performance of ESM and AM is comparable to that of WM
and HM, which are optimized for range counts. However, the accuracy of AM and ESM is rather
unstable on workloads WRange and WMarginal. For ESM, this instability is caused by numerical er-
rors in the matrix inverse operations, which can be high when the final solution matrix is low-rank.
For AM, the problem is with its post-processing step, which gives approximation solutions with
unstable quality. The performance of LRM, on the other hand, is consistently good in all settings.
7.3. Impact of Number of Queries m
In this subsection, we test the impact of the query set cardinality m on the performance of the
mechanisms. We mainly focus on settings when the number of queries m is no larger than the
domain size n. For ǫ-differential privacy, the accuracy results are reported in Figures 14, 15, 16 and
17. On WRange and WMarginal, LRM outperforms all other mechanisms, when m is significantly
smaller than n. As m grows, the performance of all mechanisms on WRange tends to converge.
The degeneration in performance of LRM is due to the lack of low rank property when the batch
contains too many random range queries. When m is no less than 256, both the WM and HM
achieve comparable accuracy to LRM, since they are optimized for range queries. On WDiscrete,
MWEM is comparable to LRM on UCI Adult data set, one possible reason is that MWEM can
make use of the sparsity of the data on WDiscrete workload. On WRelated workload, the accuracy
of LRM is dramatically higher than the other methods, for all values of m. This is because the rank
of the WRelated workload is fixed to s, regardless of the number of queries. Finally, we observe that
on WDiscrete and WRange, while the performance of other mechanisms does not differ much from
data to data, the data-dependent method MWEM generally performs better on the UCI Adult dataset
compared to on other datasets, due to the high sparsity of UCI Adult.
For (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, we report the results in Figures 18, 19, 20 and 21. We have the
following observations from these results. On WDiscrete, WRange and WRelated workload, WM
and HM improve upon the naive Gaussian mechanism; however, on WMarginal, WM and HM
incur higher errors than GM. AM and ESM again exhibit similar performance, which is often better
than that of WM, HM, and GM. LRM consistently outperforms its competitors in all test cases.
7.4. Impact of Varying Query Rank s
The previous experiments demonstrate LRM’s substantial performance advantages when the work-
load matrix has low rank. In this set of experiments, we manually control the rank of workloadW to
verify this observation. Recall that the parameter s determines the size of the matrix Cm×s and the
size of the matrix As×n during the generation of the WRelated workload. When C and A contain
only independent rows/columns, s is exactly the rank of the workload matrix W = CA. In Figure
22 and 23, we vary s from 0.1×min(m,n) to 1×min(m,n).
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Fig. 14. Effect of number of queries m on workload WDiscrete under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 15. Effect of number of queries m on workload WRange under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 16. Effect of number of queries m on workload WMarginal under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 17. Effect of number of queries m on workload WRelated under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
For ǫ-differential privacy, LRM outperforms all other methods by at least one order of magnitude
when s is low. With increasing s, the performance gap gradually closes. This phenomenon confirms
that the low rank property is the main reason behind LRM’s advantages. For (ǫ, δ)-differential
privacy, LRM also gives the best performance in all test cases; its performance advantage decreases
with s, though at a much slower rate compared to the case of ǫ-differential privacy.
7.5. Scalability of the Low-Rank Mechanism
Finally, we demonstrate the efficiency and scalability of LRM under ǫ- and (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy.
The running time of LRM is dominated by the optimization module that solves the best workload
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Fig. 18. Effect of number of queries m on workload WDiscrete under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ =
0.0001
64 128 256 512 1024
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(a) Search Logs
64 128 256 512 1024
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(b) Net Trace
64 128 256 512 1024
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(c) Social Network
64 128 256 512 1024
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(d) UCI Adult
Fig. 19. Effect of number of queries m on workload WRange under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
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Fig. 20. Effect of number of queries m on workload WMarginal under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and
δ = 0.0001
64 128 256 512 1024
105
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(a) Search Logs
64 128 256 512 1024
105
106
107
108
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(b) Net Trace
64 128 256 512 1024
105
106
107
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(c) Social Network
64 128 256 512 1024
105
106
107
108
109
Query size m
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
GM
WM
HM
AM
ESM
LRM
(d) UCI Adult
Fig. 21. Effect of number of queries m on workload WRelated under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ =
0.0001
decomposition, which is independent of the dataset. In Figure 24 and Figure 25, we vary the domain
size n from 128 to 8192 and the number of queries m from 64 to 256, respectively, and report the
total running time of LRM for the 4 different types of workloads in our experiments. LRM scales
roughly linearly with the domain size n and the number of queries m (note that both axes are in log-
arithmic scale). Moreover, we observe that for workload WRelated, LRM runs faster when the rank
s of the workload is lower, given the same values of n and m. LRM under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
is slightly more efficient than under ǫ-differential privacy. This is expected, since we set a smaller
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Fig. 22. Effect of parameter s with under ǫ-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1
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Fig. 23. Effect of parameter s under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy with ǫ = 0.1 and δ = 0.0001
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Fig. 24. Scalability of LRM under ǫ-differential privacy
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Fig. 25. Scalability of LRM under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy
value of r for (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. In all settings, LRM always terminates within 20 minutes for
each experiment. In practice, this computation time pays off as LRM achieves significantly higher
accuracy than existing methods.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents the low rank mechanism (LRM), an optimization framework that minimizes
the overall error of the results for a batch of linear queries under differential privacy. The pro-
posed method is the first practical method for a large number of linear queries, with an efficient and
effective implementation using well established optimization techniques. Experiments show that
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LRM significantly outperforms other state-of-the-art differentially private query processing mech-
anisms, often by orders of magnitude. The current design of LRM focuses on exploiting the cor-
relations between different queries. One interesting direction for future work is to further optimize
LRM by utilizing also the correlations between data values, e.g., as is done in [Xu et al. 2013;
Rastogi and Nath 2010; Li et al. 2011].
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A. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE APPROXIMATE MATRIX MECHANISM
Li et al. [Li et al. 2010] describes two implementations of the Matrix Mechanism, which optimizes
the accuracy of a batch of linear counting queries under ǫ-differential privacy. The first directly
solves the optimization program of the matrix mechanism which can be formulated as follows:
min
A∈Rr×n
‖A‖21,∞tr
(
WA†A†TWT
) (34)
whereA† denotes the pseudo-inverse of matrix A, and ‖A‖1,∞ is the maximum L1 norm of column
vectors of A. It is shown that this problem can be formulated as a semidefinite program with rank
constraint and solved by a sequence of semidefinite programs. However, it incurs high computa-
tional overhead, which is prohibitively expensive even for moderate-sized workload. The second
implementation solves an approximate version of Program (34), as follows:
min
A∈Rr×n
‖A‖22,∞tr
(
WA†A†TWT
) (35)
where ‖A‖2,∞ is the maximum L2 norm of column vectors of A. Under ǫ-differential privacy,
Program (35) is essentially the L2 approximate of the original matrix mechanism formulation. The
solution to Program (35) presented in [Li et al. 2010], however, is rather complicated, and incurs
high computational costs. In the following two subsections, we describe two implementation of the
approximate matrix mechanism, the exponential smoothing mechanism (ESM) [Yuan et al. 2012]
and the adaptive mechanism (AM) [Li and Miklau 2012] for solving Program (35).
A.1. Exponential Smoothing Mechanism
In this subsection, we present a simpler and more efficient solution, referred to as the exponential
smoothing mechanism (ESM), based on the methodology of exponential smoothing. Observe that
‖A‖22,∞ = max(diag(ATA))1, and (ATA)−1 = (ATA)† (A has full column rank). LetM = ATA,
we reformulate Program (35) as the following positive definite optimization problem:
min
M∈Rn×n
G(M) = max(diag(M))tr(WM−1WT ) s.t. M ≻ 0
A is given by A =
∑n
i
√
λiviv
T
i , where λi, vi are the ith eigenvalue and eigenvector of M ,
respectively. Calculating the second term tr(WM−1WT ) is relatively straightforward. Since it is
smooth, its gradient can be computed as −M−1WTWM−1. However, calculating the first term
max(diag(M)) is harder since it is non-smooth. Fortunately, inspired by [d’Aspremont et al. 2007],
we can still use a logarithmic and exponential function to approximate this term.
Approximate the maximum positive number: Since M is positive definite, v = diag(M) > 0.
we let µ > 0 be a sufficient small parameter and define:
fµ(v) = µ log
n∑
i
(
exp
(
vi
µ
))
(36)
We then have max(v) ≤ fµ (v) ≤ max(v) + µ logn. The gradient of the objective function in
Equation (36) with respect to v can be computed as:
∂f
∂vi
=
exp
(
vi−max(v)
µ
)
∑n
j
(
exp
(
vj−max(v)
µ
)) = exp
(
vi
µ
)
∑n
j
(
exp
(
vj
µ
)) , ∀i (37)
1We use the Matlab notations in this paper. When ∆ is a matrix, diag(∆) denotes a column vector formed from the main
diagonal of ∆, when ∆ is a vector, diag(∆) denotes a diagonal matrix with ∆ in the main diagonal entries. Moreover,
max(·) retrieves the largest element of an array.
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Since the second order hessian matrix of the objective function in Equation (36) can be computed
as:
∂2f
∂v∂v
=
diag(exp( vµ ))
µ
∑n
j
(
exp(
vj
µ )
) − exp( vµ ) exp( vµ )T
µ
(∑n
j
(
exp(
vj
µ )
))2 = S− T,
we have the upper bound of the spectral norm of the hessian: ||| ∂2f∂v∂v |||2 = |||S− T|||2 ≤ |||S|||2 +
|||T|||2 ≤ 1µ + 1µ = 2µ . Therefore, the gradient of fµ(v) is Lipschitz continuous with parameter
ω = 2µ . If we set µ =
ǫ
logn , this becomes a uniform ǫ-approximation of max(v) with a Lipschitz
continuous gradient with constant ω = 2µ =
2 log n
ǫ . In our experiments, we use µ =
0.01
logn .
To mitigate the problems with large numbers, using the property of the logarithmic and exponen-
tial functions, we can rewrite Equation (36) and Equation (37) as:
fµ(v) = max(v) + µ log
(
n∑
i
exp
(
vi −max(v)
µ
))
∂f
∂vi
=

 n∑
j
exp
(
vj − vi
µ
)
−1
, ∀i
By the chain rule of differentiation in calculus, the gradient of G(M) can be computed as:
∂G
∂M
= diag(
∂f
∂v
) · tr (WM−1WT )+ fµ(v) · (−M−1WTWM−1)
Here diag(∂f∂v ) denotes a diagonal matrix with
∂f
∂v ∈ Rn as the main diagonal entries. This
formulation allows us to run the non-monotone spectral projected gradient descent algorithm
[Birgin et al. 2000] on the cone of positive semidefiniteness. We use eigenvalue decomposition to
trim the negative eigenvalues to maintain positive semidefiniteness ofM , and iteratively improve the
result. After the algorithm terminates, we return the final M as the optimal solution to the program.
A.2. Adaptive Mechanism
In this subsection, we briefly review the adaptive mechanism (AM) proposed in
[Li and Miklau 2012], a heuristic solution for the problem in Program (35). AM considers
the following optimization problem:
min
λ∈Rn
n∑
i=1
d2i
λ2i
, s.t. (Q ⊙Q)(λ⊙ λ) ≤ 1m (38)
where Q is from the singular value decomposition of the workload matrix W = QDP with
Q ∈ Rm×n, D ∈ Rn×n, P ∈ Rn×n, and d = diag(D) ∈ Rn, i.e., the diagonal values of D.
Furthermore,⊙ is the Hadamard (entry-wise) product, 1m is a column vector of all entries equal to
one. AM then computes the strategy matrix A by
A = Qdiag(λ) ∈ Rm×n (39)
where diag(λ) is a diagonal matrix with λ as its diagonal values.
The optimization problem in (40) is non-convex since it contains quadratic term both in the ob-
jective and the constraint. By changing variable to λ ⊙ λ = u, we have the following equivalent
optimization problem:
min
u∈Rn
n∑
i=1
d2i
ui
, s.t. (Q⊙Q)u ≤ 1m, u ≥ 0. (40)
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By introducing an auxiliary variable v ∈ Rn, the optimization above can be reformulated as the
following semidefinite program:
min
u∈Rn,u∈Rn
n∑
i=1
vid
2
i , s.t. (Q⊙Q)u ≤ 1m,
[
ui 1
1 vi
]
 0, ∀i ∈ [n] (41)
which can be solved by off-the-shelf interior-point solvers.
ALGORITHM 4: Adaptive Mechanism for Approximately Solving Problem (35)
1: Input: workload matrix W ∈ Rm×n
2: Compute the SVD decomposition W = QDP to obtain Q ∈ Rm×n and d = diag(D)∈ Rn.
3: Solve the semidefinite program in Equation (41) and obtain u.
4: Compute A′ = Qdiag(
√
u) ∈ Rm×n and A′′ = diag(
√
max(o)1n − o) ∈ Rn×n where
oi = ‖A′i‖22, i = 1, ...n, o ∈ Rn.
5: Output the strategy matrix A:
A =
[
A′
A′′
]
∈ R(m+n)×n
The complete AM algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 4. Given a workload matrix W , AM
automatically selects a different set of “eigen-queries” Q and use a nonnegative combination of Q
to compute the strategy matrix A with respect to the workload matrix. First, in Step 2 the algorithm
performs the SVD decomposition ofW to derive the eigen-queriesQ. Based on the eigen-queriesQ,
AM aims to find the optimal linear combination λ(λ ≥ 0) with λ = √u by solving the semidefinite
program in Step 3. In Step 4, the matrix A′ that is constructed is a candidate strategy but may
have one or more columns whose norm is less than the sensitivity. In this case, AM adds queries
or completes columns in order to further reduce the expected error without raising the sensitivity.
Essentially AM searches over a reduced subspace of A. Hence, the candidate strategy matrix A′
solved from the optimization problem in (35) does not guarantee to be the optimal strategy since it
is limited to a weighted nonnegative combination of the fixed eigen-queries Q in Equation (39).
B. ASYMPTOTIC ERROR BOUNDS FOR LRM
B.1. LRM Error Bounds under ǫ-Differential Privacy
In this subsection, we prove the lower bound and upper bound of the error incurred by the optimal
workload decomposition solved from Program (9), and analyze the gap between the two bounds.
First, we establish an error upper bound for LRM in the following lemma.
LEMMA B.1. Error upper bound under ǫ-differential privacy. Given a workload matrix W
of rank s with singular values {λ1, . . . , λs}, an upper bound of the expected squared error of
MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) w.r.t. the optimal decomposition W = B∗L∗ is 2
∑s
k=1 λ
2
k/ǫ
2
.
PROOF. Consider the naive method NOD, which can be considered as a special case of LRM by
setting B = W and L = I (i.e., identity matrix). Clearly, ∆(L) = 1. According to Lemma 4.2, the
expected squared error of this decomposition is:
2Φ(B)∆(L)2/ǫ2 = 2‖W‖2F/ǫ2 = 2
s∑
k=1
λ2k/ǫ
2
We reach the conclusion of the lemma.
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Next we derive a lower bound on the squared error for linear counting queries under ǫ-differential
privacy, using geometric analysis under orthogonal projection [Hardt and Talwar 2010]. To do this,
we first present the following lemma, which is used later in our geometric analysis.
LEMMA B.2. For all orthogonal V ∈ Rs×n, we have the following inequality:
Vol(V Bn1 ) ≥ Vol(Bs2) · n−
s
2
where Vol(Bs2) denotes the volume of unit Euclidean ball, and Vol(V Bn1 ) denotes the volume of
unit ball of the L1 norm on Rn after the orthogonal transformation under V .
PROOF. By Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have ‖x‖1 ≤
√
n‖x‖ for all x ∈ Rn, therefore, the
n-dimensional ℓ1 ball contains an ℓ2 ball of radius n−
1
2 , i.e. Bn1 ⊇ n−
1
2Bn2 . Given an orthogonal
transformation V , we obtain V Bn1 ⊇ n−
1
2V Bn2 . Moreover, because the orthogonal projection of a
Euclidean ball is a lower-dimensional Euclidean ball of the same radius, it holds that n− 12V Bn2 =
n−
1
2Bs2 . Therefore, the volume of V Bn1 is bounded from below by:
Vol(V Bn1 ) ≥ Vol(n−
1
2Bs2)
= Vol(Bs2) · n−
s
2 .
We are now ready to prove the error lower bound of LRM.
LEMMA B.3. Error Lower Bound under ǫ-differential privacy. Given a workload matrix W
of rank s with singular values {λ1, . . . , λs}, the expected squared error of any ǫ-differential privacy
mechanism is at least
Ω

s4
n
(
2s
s!
s∏
k=1
λk
)2/s
/ǫ2


PROOF. Corollary 3.4 in [Hardt and Talwar 2010] proves that any ǫ-differential privacy mecha-
nism for linear counting queries incurs expected squared error no less than: 2
Ω
(
k3 (Vol(PWBn1 ))
2/k /ǫ2
)
In the formula above, Bn1 is the L1-unit ball. Vol(PWBn1 ) is the volume of the unit ball af-
ter the linear transformation PW , in which P is any orthogonal linear transformation matrix
from Rn 7→ Rs. To prove the lemma, we construct an orthogonal transformation P = UT ,
where U is obtained form the SVD decomposition of W (W = UΣV ). According to properties
of SVD decomposition, UTU and V V T are identity matrices. Thus, we have Vol(PWBn1 ) =
Vol(PUV V TΣV Bn1 ) = Vol(V (V
TΣV )Bn1 ) = Vol(V B
n
1 )
∏s
k=1 λk . The last equality holds due
to Lemma 7.5 in [Hardt and Talwar 2010]. Consider the the convex body V Bn1 . By Lemma B.2,
it has a lower bound Vol(Bs2) ·
(
n−
s
2
)
. Note that Vol(Bs2) can be computed using the Gamma
function [Ball 1997]: πs/2Γ(1+s/2) . Using the Stirling’s formula, we know that Γ(1 + s/2) is roughly√
2πe−s/2(s/2)s/2+1/2, so that Vol(Bs2) is roughly
(
2πe
s
) s
2
. Therefore, the lower bound can be
computed as: Ω
(
s4
n (
2s
s!
∏s
k=1 λk)
2/s/ǫ2
)
. We thus reach the conclusion of the lemma.
Next we compare the error upper and lower bounds. The analysis involves a matrix-theory con-
cept called the generalized condition number.
2[Hardt and Talwar 2010] used absolute errors, from which which we derived the squared errors.
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Definition B.4. Generalized condition number. Given a workload matrix W , the generalized
condition number κ(W ) of W defined as the product of the spectral norm of W and that of its
pseudo-inverse or equivalently, the ratio between the largest singular value of W to the nonzero
smallest [Chen and Dongarra 2005; Beltra´n 2011].
κ(W ) , |||W |||2 · |||W †|||2 = λ1
λs
Note that we always have κ(W ) ≥ 1.
THEOREM B.5. When s > 5, the gap between the upper and lower bounds of the error incurred
by mechanism MLRM,ǫ(Q,D) with the optimal decomposition W = B∗L∗ is O
(
(κ(W ))2 ns
)
.
PROOF. The theorem is established by comparing the upper and lower bounds in Lemmas B.1
and B.3, as follows.
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≤ 2nsλ
2
1(
2s
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4
=
2nκ(W )2(
2s
s!
)2/s
s3
≤ 1
8
κ(W )2
n
s
The last inequality holds due to the fact that s! <
(
s
2
)s
when s > 5. Note that all the inequalities
above are tight, and the equalities hold when κ(W ) = 1, i.e. λ1 = λ2 = . . . = λs.
From the theorem above, we draw the following interesting observations. (i) When the rank of the
matrix is low (i.e., s is small) and the batch queries are highly correlated (κ(W )≫ 1), then the ratio
of the upper bound to the lower bound is large, meaning that LRM can potentially achieve lower
error than NOD. (ii) Conversely, when the rank of the matrix is full rank (s → n and n ≤ m) and
the batch queries are almost random or independent (κ(W ) → 1), then the achievable error rate of
LRM converges to the upper error bound obtained by NOD. Therefore, in this situation, NOD might
be good enough and no sophisticated algorithm is needed, which is validated by the experimental
results in Section 7.3). These results are consistent with the work of [Ghosh et al. 2012], who show
that Laplace mechanism is optimal in a strong sense when answering a single linear query.
B.2. LRM Error Bounds under (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy
We first derive an upper bound for the error of LRM. Unlike the case of ǫ-differential privacy, we
have a tighter error upper bound than that obtained by naive methods. We introduce the concept of ρ-
coherence of a matrix, which is similar to µ-coherence [Cande`s and Recht 2009] and C-coherence
[Hardt and Roth 2012] of a matrix in the low-rank optimization literature.
Definition B.6. ρ-coherence of a matrix. Given a matrix W with its SVD decomposition that
W = UΣV , where U ∈ Rm×s,Σ ∈ Rs×s, V ∈ Rs×n. We say the matrix W is ρ-coherent if
ρ(W ) = max
i
‖Vi‖2, i = 1, ..., n
where Vi is the i-th column of V . Note that we have 0 < ρ(W ) ≤ 1.
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LEMMA B.7. Error Upper Bound under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Given a workload matrix
W of rank s with singular values {λ1, . . . , λs}, an upper bound of the expected squared error of
MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) w.r.t. the optimal decomposition W = B∗L∗ is (ρ(W ))2
∑s
k=1 λ
2
k/h(ǫ, δ)
2
.
PROOF. To prove the lemma, we perform SVD decomposition of W , obtaining W = UΣV .
Then, we build a decomposition B = ρ(W )UΣ and L = 1ρ(W )V . This is a valid decomposition of
W , because BL = ρ(W )UΣ 1ρ(W )V = UΣV = W .
Next we prove that ∆(L) = 1. According to properties of the SVD transformation, column
vectors in V are orthogonal vectors; hence, for every column Vj in V , we have ‖Vj‖2 ≤ ρ(W ).
Therefore, Θ(L) = maxj
(∑
i L
2
ij
)1/2
= maxj
1
ρ(W )‖Vj‖2 = 1.
The expected squared error of this decomposition is then bounded by:
Φ(B) = tr(BTB)/h(ǫ, δ)2
= tr((ρ(W )UΣ)T (ρ(W )UΣ))/h(ǫ, δ)2
= ρ(W )2tr(ΣTUTUΣ))/h(ǫ, δ)2
= ρ(W )2
s∑
k=1
λ2k/h(ǫ, δ)
2
We thus reach the conclusion of the lemma.
Note that since ρ(W ) ≤ 1, the above error bound is no worse than the error obtained by NOD.
Meanwhile, the proof essentially describes another simple solution whose accuracy is no worse than
NOD.
We now focus on the error lower bound of LRM under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. This has already
been studied in [Li and Miklau 2013], and we summarize their results with our notations in the
following lemma.
LEMMA B.8. Error Lower Bound under (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy [Li and Miklau 2013].
Given a workload matrix W of rank s with singular values {λ1, . . . , λs}, the expected squared
error of MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) w.r.t. the optimal decomposition W = B∗L∗ is at least
1
nh(ǫ, δ)2
(
s∑
i=1
λi
)2
The proof of the above result in [Li and Miklau 2013] is rather complicated. In the following we
provide a simple proof.
PROOF.
min
W=BL,
∀j
∑r
i
L2
ij
≤1
1
h(ǫ, δ)2
‖B‖2F ≥
1
nh(ǫ, δ)2
min
W=BL
‖L‖2F · ‖B‖2F
=
1
nh(ǫ, δ)2
(‖W‖∗)2
=
1
nh(ǫ, δ)2
(
s∑
i=1
λi
)2
The first inequality is due to
∑n
j
(∑r
i L
2
ij
) ≤ n. Note that this inequality above is tight, and the
equality holds when every column of L lies on the surface of the unit ball. The first equality is due
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to the variational formulation of nuclear norm (see, e.g., [Srebro et al. 2004]) that
‖W‖∗ = min
B,L
‖L‖F · ||B||F , s.t. W = BL.
We thus reach the conclusion of the lemma.
We next compare the error upper bound and the error lower bound for LRM under (ǫ, δ)-
differential privacy.
THEOREM B.9. The ratio between the error upper and lower bounds of mechanism
MLRM,(ǫ,δ)(Q,D) with the optimal decomposition W = B∗L∗ is bounded by O
(
(κ(W ))2 ns
)
.
PROOF.
We compare the upper and lower bounds in B.7 and B.8, as follows.
ρ(W )2
∑s
k=1 λ
2
k/h(ǫ, δ)
2
1
n (
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i=1 λi)
2
/h(ǫ, δ)2
=
ρ(W )2
∑s
k=1 λ
2
k
1
n (
∑s
i=1 λi)
2
≤ sλ
2
1ρ(W )
2
1
nλ
2
ss
2
= (κ(W )ρ(W ))2
n
s
We thus reach the conclusion of the theorem.
The above theorem leads to similar conclusions as in the case of ǫ-differential privacy, except that
here we compare LRM with an improved version of NOD described in the proof of Lemma B.7.
Meanwhile, the above ratio also involves an additional parameter ρ, i.e., the coherence number of
the workload matrix.
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